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ABSTRACT
It is the proposal of this study that the three major 
areas of research in current mass communication study (direct 
effects, agenda-setting, and uses/gratifientions) are not 
contradictory, but rather contribute to a functional model 
of mass communication effects. The study examined the func­
tions and effects of a single televised program by a politi­
cal candidate, looking for persuasive effect, ability of the 
speech to set the public’s agenda, and the relationship of 
the function to the effect, attempting to integrate the 
concepts. A 25-minute televised campaign speech by Ronald 
Reagan, major competitor for the Republican presidential 
nomination in 1976, was employed as the stimulus. Telephone 
interviews before and after the broadcast were conducted 
using a randomly selected sample.
Results indicated no direct effects of viewing on 
attitude change, although the lack of change is not attribu­
table to selective exposure. Neither predisposition toward 
the candidate nor political party (Republican, Democrat) 
affected viewing behavior. Also, subjects who were not 
committed to either Democratic or Republican party (inde­
pendents) were the ones who watched the most.
Exposure to the program did not cause any signifi­
cant agenda change, although the change is moderate and is 
toward the stimulus agenda.
The reason of the viewer for watching the program 
seemed to intervene between message and the effect. Post­
exposure candidate evaluation was significantly higher for 
subjects who watched "a lot" for personality reasons than for 
those who watched "a little" or "not at all" for that reason. 
In addition, subjects who watched "a lot" to leam more 
about the issues recalled significantly more issues than 
those who watched "a little" or "not at all" for those 
reasons. Thus the suggestion of this study that the func­
tion of the media for the consumer is an important variable 
in the effects process is supported.
Overall, the results support the possibility and 
need for an integrated model of mass communication effects.
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MEASURING THE IMPACT OF A TELEVISED POLITICAL PROGRAM;
COMBINING THREE RESEARCH PERSPECTIVES
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
In modern mass communication research it is often 
asserted that study of media effects is not particularly 
fruitful (Blumler and Katz, 1974). This assertion seems to 
be reflective of the beginnings of a shift not only of 
research areas, but from a narrowly behavioral paradigm. 
Rather than assume even the somewhat cognitive model of 
stimulus-intervening variable-response, many mass communi­
cation researchers seem to be reaching for an even more 
cognitive approach. The individual is seen as an informa­
tion seeker, selecting those stimuli which affect him, and 
thus controlling to a great extent his own actions and 
reactions. The purpose of the individual in his conscious 
selection of media stimuli, the attention he gives to it, 
and the use he makes of the information are all primary 
foci of this approach (Katz, Blumler, and Gurevitch, 1974; 
Lundberg and Huiten, 1974).
It seems important, however, to examine more closely 
what one means in stating that it is no longer helpful to
1
2look for mass media effects. For the most part, scientists 
seem to be referring to persuasive effects--an adaptation 
of attitude change research with the addition of a mass 
channel. One has only to look at the classic research in 
the area (Lazarsfeld, 1949; Klapper, 1960) to see that 
studies do indicate that immediate attitude change does not 
take place, but rather, effects are in the form of reinforce­
ment, mobilization, or subtle changes in cognition. The 
diffusion research tradition (Rogers, 1962) suggests that 
the mass media may make people aware of innovations and may 
arouse interest but has little effect in actual adoption, or 
conversion. All this has led to the concept of the "limited 
effects" model.
Because it is "known" that the media have little 
direct effect, many current researchers advocate that a 
"functional" approach be employed, asking such questions as 
"How do people use the media?" and "What are the relevant 
media functions in society?" Consistent with the cognitive 
paradigm, the active individual or active selective society 
is assumed. Stinchcombe (1968) posits the following defi­
nition of functionalism: "a functional explanation is one
in which the consequences of some behavior or social arrange­
ment are essential elements of the causes of that behavior."
A diagram further illustrates Stinchcombe’s concept of a 
functional arrangement :
s  ~ ~ ~________  H
  ^
"S" represents the structure or behavior which has a causal 
impact on "H". ”H" is the consequence, or system that is
maintained. "H" selects those "S's" which maintain it.
"T" represents other forces which have potential to change 
"H". The selection forces for "S" (caused by need for 
competition, satisfaction, reward, etc.) are stronger when 
H is not naturally maintained, i.e., when "T" is higher.
The basic view, then, is of an individual system or 
social system, which, though it is unconsciously affected 
by some stimuli, consciously seeks out much of the stimuli 
which affect it, especially (in Stinchcombe's diagram) in 
the form of maintenance. Study questions become "How does 
this happen?" "For what reasons is the information sought?" 
"To fulfill what needs?" How do the cognitive changes take 
place?" In addition other kinds of effects must be examined, 
particularly those resulting from the study of functions.
For example, it has been posited that the mass media raise 
the salience of issues, contribute to the establishment and 
maintenance of norms and fads, have an "agenda-setting" 
function, provide learning opportunities, provide "play" or 
"pleasure" or entertainment for viewers, depending on how 
they are used.
Even though the terms being used are somewhat dif­
ferent, many of the things actually being looked at were
4part of the early effects research. The concern for func­
tions of the media is obvious in Lasswell's description of 
the four basic functions -served by the media in American 
society (surveillance, correlation, transmission of heri­
tage, and entertainment). Also, from the uses and gratifi­
cation perspective, Blumler and McQuail (1959) and others 
are hypothesizing that people use the media to meet particu­
lar needs, and the use of the media by the individual will 
interact with its effects on him. For example, if a person 
watches a political advertisement because he could not avoid 
it (it came on while he was watching another program), its 
effect on him may be different from on the person who chooses 
to watch to gain information. Various reasons for watching 
are being discovered in this area of research, though 
empirical testing of the effects of the reason for attend­
ing has not been done. Early voting studies described the 
"selectivity processes," indicating chat the individual 
actively exposes himself to stimuli which support or main­
tain his preconceptions. His need of reinforcement causes 
his use of the media for that purpose.
The work by McCombs, et al. (19 72, 1975) in agenda- 
setting ("the media may not tell us what to think, but they 
are very successful at telling us what to think about"-- 
Cohen, 1963) has roots in the findings by diffusionists 
that media create awareness which may aid in the moderniza­
tion process. Lazarsfeld, et al. (1948) found from the
5Erie County study that "insofar as mass media of communica­
tion led to conversion at all, it was through a redefinition 
of issues. . . Issues about which people had previously
thought very little or had been little concerned took on a 
new importance as they were accepted by campaign propaganda." 
Many of the gatekeeping studies, though principally con­
cerned with how the information flowed, were looking at an 
end result of what issues the public were aware of.
In modern agenda-setting research, the attempts to 
get at the nature of mass media effects has focused on broad 
topics of public agenda. Only a few have looked at the 
ability of a political program to set the public's agenda of 
issues. Results are inconsistent, and further research 
needs to be conducted to determine in which situations the 
agenda-setting function is operant.
Purpose of the Study
In attempting to study either functions or effects 
of mass communication, no one to this point has considered 
a combined approach of the three research areas outlined.
Work has been done in each area, studying direct persuasive 
effects, agenda-setting effects, and describing functions 
of the media for viewers. It seems that these approaches 
should not be contradictory, but complementary, and that 
much could be gained in establishing a broad research per­
spective for mass communication studies by looking at the 
totality of their implications. If such a combination of
6thinking should prove workable, time and effort now being 
spent studying isolated and over-simplified questions could 
be directed toward a more complete comprehension of both 
functions and various types of effects of mass communication.
In addition, these theories need to be tested toge­
ther in a situation in which one can control for other 
variables and yet maintain as non-artificial a setting as 
possible. The area of political mass communication offers 
potential for this kind of testing and control, and provides 
attitude objects, issue information, agendas of relevant 
issues, and wide exposure of messages. Also, the question 
of effects is of primary importance in a political situation. 
Although concerns with functions, gratifications and agenda- 
setting effects are now at the forefront of political mass 
communication research, belief in the direct persuasive 
effects model has not been abandoned totally. Political 
campaign researchers and strategists in particular, are 
reluctant to agree that media advertising has no persuasive 
effect.  '
This study will examine the functions and effects 
of a single televised speech by a political candidate, 
looking for persuasive effect, ability of the speech to set 
the public's agenda, and the relationship of the function 
to the effect. It will use a field quasi-experimenta1 pro­
cedure, employing as stimulus a 25-minute televised campaign 
speech by Ronald Reagan, a major competitor for the
7Republican presidential nomination in 1976. Telephone 
surveys before and after the broadcast will attempt to 
determine agenda of issues, attitudes toward the speaker, 
demographic and political involvement information, reasons 
for viewing behavior, and recall of issues discussed.
Although the study deals with only one medium (tele­
vision) and therefore results cannot be unconditionally 
generalized across mediated communication situations, the 
study should provide information on the areas outlined.
If the results seem fruitful, further research can be done 
with the introduction of various media types as relevant 
variables. Analysis of the televised political message and 
viewing behavior outlined will add to information concerning 
functions and effects of televised political messages, and 
implications for a research model can be considered.
Description of Following Chapters
Chapter XI will review literature related to the 
research questions and will present specific hypotheses to 
be tested. Chapter III will describe experimental proce­
dures, measuring instruments, and methods of statistical 
analysis. Chapter IV reports data collected in the study 
and results of analysis of that data. Chapter V includes 
discussion of the findings, limitations of the study, and 
directions for future research.
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE
Determining the effects produced by exposure to a 
single televised political program requires incorporation 
of the findings of previous research to provide a broad 
understanding of the concepts involved. Three major areas 
of research provide the most significant theoretic frame­
works and contribute most to scientific inquiry concerning 
media effects. First is the literature investigating 
direct persuasive effects of the media. A second body of 
literature suggests that the effects of the media are pri­
marily in establishing an agenda of issues for the public 
to think about. The final area of significance is the 
research tradition involving functions of the media for 
consumers and the influence of the function on the effect.
This chapter relates these areas of research and 
discusses their implications to this study's hypotheses 
concerning specific functions and effects of televised 
political advertising.
9Direct Effects 
Researchers who conducted the earliest voting studies 
were surprised to find that the effects of the media in 
voting decisions were strictly limited (Lazarsfeld, 1944; 
Lazarsfeld, et al., 1948). Rather than making a decision 
individualistically or from direct media influence, voters 
seemed to be highly influenced by interpersonal communica­
tion, particularly by "opinion leaders" (Lazarsfeld, 1944). 
The Erie County study (1948) discovered that these "opinion 
leaders" are highly attentive to media campaign messages 
and use the information to help make their own decisions. 
Other voters get their information from these people rather 
than attending to and making voting decisions directly from 
media messages. The study also indicated that exposure is 
a result of interest in the campaign messages that support 
voters' predispositions toward the candidates. The Erie 
County study outlines three major effects of campaigns on 
voters : the campaigns reinforce partisanship, activated
the indifferent and converted only those who were not firmly 
committed (Lazarsfeld, et al.', 1948). Berelson (1954) 
found similar effects, noting however, that the more exposure 
voters had to the mass media campaign, the more correct was 
their information on the position of the candidates on the 
issues. Tendency to change position was negatively cor­
related with high media exposure, however.
10
The University of Michigan Survey Research Center's 
classic studies are widely considered to be the best indica­
tion that all inputs into the voting decision are translated 
into partisan attitudes toward one side or the other. In 
Campbell, Gurin, and Miller (1954) and The American Voter 
(Campbell, et al., 1964) the same questions were used to 
determine partisan attitudes. The attitudes correlated 
highly with Presidential preference in the 1952 and the 
1956 elections. Overall, the Survey Research Center studies 
conclude that party identification is the single greatest 
vote determinant, and that issues and image stimuli are 
filtered through the selective bias of party affiliation.
These and other early direct effect studies are syn­
thesized by Klapper (1960); Weiss, in Lindsey and Aronson 
(1969); and Nimmo and Savage (1976). The findings have 
come to be termed the "law of minimal effects" and have
^been widely accepted by scholars of mass communication. 
Nimmo and Savage (1976) point out, however, that evidence 
suggests that this "law" has definite qualifications. Five 
major qualifications will be discussed here.
First, most of the classic voting research used to 
support the minimal effects model pre-dates the dominance 
of television as a source of political information.
Kraus (1974) indicates that not only do the studies pre­
date the television era in politics but most fail to con­
sider mass media as serious variables.
11
Second, although much of the research done in the 
area has been survey research, there are some experimental 
studies which contradict the survey findings by indicating 
that media campaign exposure may affect people of varying 
interest levels to change perception of candidates and 
issues. In addition, the media exposure may even influence 
voting decisions. (Most of these studies are discussed 
further under specific research areas.) (See Brownstein, 
1971; Kaid, 1975; Donahue, 1972; Davis, Dyson, and Scioli, 
1976.)*
Third, research indicates that even when a direct 
influence on voting decision is not present, the media may 
serve to affect people's images of political candidates 
(McClure and Patterson, 1974). In a study of the 1972 
presidential election, McClure and Patterson interviewed
*A number of early studies reported moderate to high 
attitude change as a result of communication in experimental 
conditions (for synthesis, see Hovland, 1954). It has been 
suggested, however, that tba-discrepancy in results reported 
by experimental studies and survey research may be a product 
of the research design itself (Hovland, 1959). For example, 
the people who expose themselves to the communication mes­
sage of an experimental study are not the same people who 
would expose themselves to mass media messages. The size of 
the communication unit (an entire program or campaign of 
communication versus a specific message) may also be a factor. 
In a typical experiment, the effect is usually observed 
shortly after the communication treatment, whereas in survey 
research the time interval between communication exposure and 
effect measurement is usually somewhat longer. Another pos­
sible contributing factor is the interpersonal contact avail­
able in survey research. Experimental studies have found 
that communication in a situation in which group membership 
is salient is met with more resistance to countemorm influ­
ence than it is under conditions of low salience. Thus, 
although experimental research contradicts the "law of mini­
mal effects ' to some degree, the contradiction may be 
explainable in light of design differences.
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subjects in Syracuse, New York, examining influence of the 
media in changing beliefs about the candidate rather than 
only looking for attitude change. Results showed that 
although television news had little effect in changing 
voters’ beliefs, television advertising did directly affect 
voters' beliefs about the candidates, even among subjects 
with little interest in the campaign. To study effects on 
attitude change, McClure and Patterson measured attitudes 
before and after three "Democrats for Nixon" advertisements 
were shown. In two of the three spots attitudes changed in 
the direction of the ads, though in the third case they 
changed in the opposite direction.
Recent studies by Nimmo and Savage (1975) and Davis, 
Dyson, and Scioli (1976) investigate components of candidate 
image. Using hypotheses based on previous research on image 
voting, the Davis, Dyson, and Scioli research indicates that 
candidate images are probably not formed strictly on the 
basis of candidate-provided information. They report inter­
play between voter predispositions, issue positions, and the 
information provided by the candidates on personal attri­
butes , issue positions, and philosophy of government. (See 
also O'Keefe and Sheinkopf, 19 74).
A fourth problem with the law of minimal effects is 
that the lack of effects is often dependent on the strong 
partisan commitment of the voters. DeVries and Tarrance 
(1972) found that approximately one-third of those who vote
13
do not vote a straight party ballot. A portion of those who 
do not vote straight party tickets are "independents" in 
the traditional definition (they do not identify with any 
party, have low interest in politics, and are low users of 
media). Another portion, however, is comprised of "ticket- 
split ters"-- differing from independents in that they do 
identify to some extent with a party, but are not bound by 
it; they are highly interested in politics and are high 
users of media. Pool (1971) states that although decline 
in party identification is a fact, it indicates rising 
interest in a new kind of politics, rather than a lack of 
political interest. The use of mass media, especially tele­
vision, is making a change in political activity and inter­
est, a change toward concern with image and issues as opposed 
to party identification.
A final factor which may alter the wide-spread 
belief in the limited effects model is the questioning of 
the validity of the selective exposure concept. Although 
field research (Lazarsfeld, et al., 1948) reports that 
people tend to expose themselves to political messages which 
support their predispositions, very little empirical evi­
dence is available to substantiate the concept. The majority 
of work in the area has been done by social psychologists 
interested in the cognitive consistency models, and these 
results are inconsistent as Sears and Freedman (1967) 
report in a summary of research in the area. A group of
14
studies have shown evidence that subjects prefer supportive 
information to non-supportive information (Ehrlich, Guttman, 
Schonbach, and Mills, 1957; Adams. 1961; Mills, Aronson, 
and Robinson, 1959; Rosen, 1961). Other researchers report 
that no clear preference exists for either supportive or 
non-supportive information (Feather, 1962; Mills and Ross, 
1964; Sears, 1966 ; Sears and Freedman, 1965). Two studies 
have reported evidence of a preference for non-supportive 
materials (Sears, 1965 ; Freedman, 1965a).
Sears and Freedman (1967) address the subject of 
selective exposure in political communication by carefully 
reviewing the Elmira (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee,
1954) and Erie County (Lazarsfeld, et al., 1943) studies 
which originally reported the phenomenon. They state that 
selective exposure has been-operationalized in the studies 
as any systematic bias in audience composition, unusual 
agreement about a matter of opinion, or preference for sup­
portive over non-supportive information. They suggest that 
the evidence reported in the early studies is for some kind 
of "de facto" selectivity. For example, in the Lazarsfeld, 
et al. (1948) study, respondents had been predominantly 
exposed to propaganda supporting their predispositions, 
but this only held for Republicans. Democrats were equally 
divided in exposure. Content analysis showed a greater 
percentage of Republican propaganda available for consump­
tion. In addition, the measuring devices may have contributed
15
to the findings. Interviews are post-hoc, therefore they 
may have measured selective exposure or they may have mea­
sured attitude change. "After only" measures maximize the 
probability of obtaining de facto selectivity, since any 
attitude change is likely to reduce the discrepancy between 
communicator's and respondent's position, rather than 
increase it. Also, Sears and Freedman point out that 
retrospective self-report may yield information that is a 
biased product of selective retention. Direct or immediate 
observation would be more accurate.
Several studies have tested selective exposure to a 
series of political messages (Trenaman and McQuail, 1961; 
Stempel, 1961; Greenberg, 1965; Rhine, 1967; Grupp, 1970; 
Bartlett, Drew, Fahle and Watts, 1974) with inconsistent 
results. Very few studies have examined selective exposure 
to a specific political message. Schramm and Carter (1959) 
studied the effects of a 20-hour telethon by a candidate 
for the office of governor of California in 1958. Inter­
views conducted four days after the telethon indicated that 
approximately 10 per cent of the sample watched any of the 
program. Republicans, comprising 25 per cent of the sample, 
represented 50 per cent of the viewing audience. The per­
centage of Democrats viewing was about the same as the 
percentage represented in the sample. Republicans watched 
twice as long as Democrats and were more likely to have 
watched during non-prime time hours. Republicans were also
16
more likely than Democrats to have tuned in by design rather 
than by accident.
Raid and Hirsch (19 73) investigated three research 
questions: (1) Are those who come to hear a political can­
didate speak favorably predisposed toward him? (2) Does a 
single appearance of a political candidate produce a favor­
able shift in his image? (3) If there is a favorable shift 
in his image, will it persist over time? Using a 1972 
appearance of Senator Edmund Muskie at Southern Illinois 
University in Garbondale, Illinois, the researchers obtained 
demographic information and pre-test, post-test, and delayed 
post-test measures of candidate image for respondents who 
attended the address by Muskie. Findings indicated that 47.17 
per cent of the sample were not of the same political party 
as the speaker. The single appearance of the candidate 
resulted in a significantly favorable shift in his image, 
and that shift persisted over time although the factors com­
prising the image changed somewhat. In general the study 
did not support either the selective exposure concept or the 
traditionally accepted idea that a single campaign appear­
ance has little effect.
Several recent studies have indicated that televised 
political messages tend to overcome any tendency to select 
partisan exposure (Atkin, 1973; Sheinkopf and O'Keefe, 1973; 
Mendelsohn and O'Keefe, 1976), partially as a result of 
program format. "Spot" commercials (30 second, 60 second.
17
or five minutes in length) have the potential to reach the 
entire viewing audience rather than a predisposed group, and 
studies indicate that voters do get some issue information 
from exposure to spot commercials (Atkin, et al., 1973; 
Sheinkopf and O'Keefe, 1973; Shaw and Bowers, 19 73; Kaid, 
1975; Patterson and McClure, 1974). Although no direct 
link to voting behavior has been found, some subjects report 
that their vote decisions are influenced by commercials.
Since most of this work has been done with spot commercials, 
very little can be said about its application to advertise­
ments of longer length.
Direct Effects Summary 
Although the "limited effects" model has been widely 
accepted, several factors outlined above may mitigate those 
findings. First, most of the research used to support the 
minimal effects model pre-dates the dominance of television 
as a source of political information. Second, although much 
of the research done in the area has been survey research, 
some experimental studies contradict these findings, report­
ing direct persuasive effects. Third, there is evidence 
for mass media effects on formation of image of the political 
candidates. Fourth, the lack of effects has been attributed 
partly to strong partisan commitment of the voters, and that 
commitment may be declining rapidly. Fifth, the selective 
exposure thought to hinder direct influence may not actually 
be operant.
18
Additionally, recent literature concerning spot 
commercials indicate some influence on both issue informa­
tion gain and voting decision.
Given these limitations, it seems that the question 
of direct effects is again open. The contradictory evi­
dence concerning direct persuasive effects and image 
formation, coupled with the change in partisan identifica­
tion, suggests that it would be helpful to re-examine 
effects of a televised political advertisement, with attempts 
to avoid the design limitations present in several of the 
studies cited. Because the findings concerning selective 
exposure are so inconsistent, especially in the area of 
political research, it too needs to be tested. Use of a 
before-after design will eliminate the possibility of the 
"de facto selectivity" suggested in former research.
Hypotheses
H^: There will be a significant change in attitude
toward the speaker as a result of exposure to 
the televised political commercial.
H,: Respondents who are initially predisposed
toward Reagan will be more likely to watch 
the broadcast than those respondents who are 
not predisposed toward Reagan.
Ho : A significantly greater number of Republicans
than Democrats will watch the broadcast.
Agenda-Setting
Early findings that the media alter cognitions, 
raise salience of issues, and help users anticipate events
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in their environment (Schramm, 1957) rather than cause per­
suasive effects provide the base for the development of the 
agenda-setting hypothesis. Further evidence comes from the 
gatekeeping studies (White, 1950; Tannenbaum, 1963; Martin, 
O'Keefe and Nayman, 19 72; Donohew, 1967; Gieber, 1956) which 
indicate that types of stories, amount of coverage, and kind 
of coverage are varied according to decisions of the people 
handling the news. Therefore, through dictates of personal 
judgment and mechanical necessities, certain material is 
selected for presentation to news consumers. Thus an agenda 
of issues is established by the media. The recent studies 
in agenda-setting go a step further by comparing the media 
agenda of issues with the public issue agenda, using various 
operationalizations.
The general concept of the agenda-setting hypothesis 
is that there is a direct relationship between the media's 
coverage of issues and the public’s perception of which 
issues are important. The relationship is theorized to be 
causal: the media set the public's agenda by the amount
and type of coverage given to the issues. The first empiri­
cal testing of the agenda-setting hypothesis was done by 
McCombs and Shaw (1972) in their interview of "undecided" 
voters in the 1968 presidential election. Major campaign 
news sources in the area were content-analyzed and news 
content was categorized into "major" and "minor" items. 
Correlations between item emphasis on the campaign issues
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carried by the media and voters' perceptions of what were 
the important issues were high for both major and minor items 
(+.967, +.979). The high correlations must be considered, 
however, in light of the exclusion of voters whose decisions 
had already been made. Thus the operation of the agenda- 
setting function in this case is consistent with the "limited 
effects" model which would hold that influence is more likely 
to take place where there are few predispositions toward any 
particular position.
A study of television news and voter behavior in the 
1972 presidential election (McClure and Patterson) found 
few direct effects of exposure to television news coverage 
of the campaign issues. The issues which received coverage 
correlated with the voters' perceptions about the importance 
of the issue to the candidates, though it did not increase 
the salience of the issue to the individual. When subjects 
were controlled for interest level in political affairs, 
the high and moderate levels were unrelated to change of 
belief or salience of issues. With low interest subjects, 
strong change occurred on two items concerning George 
McGovern, though no change was recorded on items concerning 
Nixon. The authors speculate that because McGovern was a 
relatively unfamiliar figure to many people, the media were 
able to provide information about him. The study indicates 
that in this situation the agenda-setting function was 
operant only for low interest subjects considering a
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candidate for whom they had little familiarity and there­
fore few predispositions.
Weaver and Spellman (1974) found moderate support 
for a relationship.between media use for political informa­
tion and the increase in salience of the Watergate issue over 
time regardless of predispositions toward political party or 
candidate. Four hundred registered voters, chosen randomly 
and controlled for economic and racial variation, were inter­
viewed in person in June and October, 1972, and by telephone 
in November, 1972 and May, 1973 by trained interviewers (n 
size dropped to 163 by the final interview). The dominant 
newspaper of the city was content analyzed during weeks of 
heaviest interviewing for references to Watergate. Thus 
predispositions did not affect the operation of the agenda- 
setting function when political information was actively 
sought through the media.
Tipton, Haney, and Baseheart (1975) studied agenda- 
setting in local and statewide elections in Kentucky. In 
addition to hypothesizing that the media set the public's 
agenda, the study suggested that the media agenda-setting 
should be strongest among individuals who are the least 
interested in the campaign. A panel study consisting of 
three interview points determined the issues of the public 
agenda, and the media agenda was established by content 
analysis. Only correlations with newspaper agenda showed 
statistical significance, with newspapers having been the
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primary source of campaign information named by voters. As 
expected, the higher the interest of voters in the campaign, 
the less change in salience of issues over time.
McCombs, Becker and Weaver (1975) examine the ques­
tion of time in agenda-setting. As it is indicated that 
some agenda-setting does take place in some circumstances, 
their concern is how long it takes for the public to learn 
the press’ agenda and over what period of time the learning 
of salience takes place. For preliminary information the 
authors cite an analysis of the 1973 Syracuse study (Stone, 
1975) and the 1972 Charlotte voter study (Shaw and Bowers, 
1973) . Statistical analysis indicates that a four month 
period extending from six months to two months prior to the 
interview period is the maximum time frame during which the 
media agendas best match the public agenda.
Another study concerned with time effects is an 
analjj^ sis of order effects of Watergate developments (Weaver, 
McCombs, and Spellman, 1975). Using cross-lagged panel cor­
relation techniques of analysis, the authors state that 
while there is some evidence that the media reflect community 
concerns, the correlations are much stronger in the opposite 
direction: the media agenda affects the public agenda.
Similar findings are reported by Stone (1975).
Studies discussed to this point have examined the 
ability of the media to set the public's agenda through 
news presentation. Several studies, however, have been
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concerned with the agenda-setting functions of political 
advertising. A 1973 study by Bower analyzed political 
advertising in the two largest newspapers in each of 23 
states which held both senatorial and gubernatorial elec­
tions in 1970. In examining advertisements by the two 
major political parties in the 15 days immediately preced­
ing the election, significant differences were found between 
the issues advertised by the two parties. Rank order cor­
relation between voter emphasis on issues and the composite 
advertising emphasis on issues was +.97. Correlations were 
also high between voter emphasis of issue and advertising 
emphasis for each individual party and at senatorial, guber­
natorial, and state representative levels. Bowers explains 
the high correlation with the fact that most candidates for 
major office now consult opinion polls to determine which 
issues voters hold important. Campaign strategies are out­
lined from this information. Thus, Bowers suggests that if 
there is a causal link, it may be in the opposite direction 
from that posited by the agenda-setting theory. That is, 
the voters may set the agenda for the media. One considera­
tion is that Harris poll data was used, which gives opinions 
on a national level. The study was done in a regional situ­
ation, which may mean that the emphasis placed on issues 
im each area may have been somewhat different from the 
national opinion.
2 4
In an investigation assessing the relationship of 
television and radio advertising exposure with several 
variables during a congressional campaign, Atkin and Heald 
(1974) found low support for the agenda-setting function.
A random telephone sample of 323 Michigan voters were asked 
an open-ended question about the issues they considered 
most important in the election. They also responded to 
items asking the relative importance of (1) the candidate's 
positions on several issues and (2) the candidate's qualities. 
The overall agenda correlated at +.18 with the advertising 
exposure index and at +.18 with the news media exposure 
index. When advertising exposure is controlled for news 
and interpersonal exposure, previous familiarity, and cam­
paign interest, the correlation is reduced to +.12. A 
group of "control" issues (not emphasized in the advertising) 
were slightly negatively correlated with advertising expo­
sure. The authors suggest that because the issues given 
priority in the commercials were perceived by exposed 
voters as important, and no difference by exposure was found 
for the control issues, the relationship between the candi­
date and voter agendas is present, though slight. They 
hypothesize that the direction of causality is from adver­
tising to agenda.
Shaw and Bowers (1973) found that with high expo­
sure to television ads, the agenda of items stressed in the 
ads correlated highly with the agenda of items subjects
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reported recalling from the ads. Correlations were +.962 
for Nixon and +.947 for McGovern. Data was collected in 
Charlotte, N.C. with person-to-person interviews of 246 
subjects. Bowers (1975), however, found a low correlation 
between the agenda of issues stressed in the ads and the 
agenda of issues considered most important by the voters.
Within the large body of literature available on 
the agenda-setting theory, the majority of research examines 
the influence of media agendas over time. The McCombs,
Becker and Weaver study cited above claims that a several 
month time span is required for items to move to the public's 
agenda from the media, although they grant that in some 
cases like the Mid-East war an issue may move more quickly 
onto the public agenda. In addition, correlation seems to 
depend somewhat upon the specificity of categories (Murdoch, 
1975). More specific categories seem to decrease the corre­
lations between media and public issue agendas.
Kaid, Hale, and Williams (1976) suggest that the 
overall power of the agenda-setting theory as an "effects" 
predictor is significantly lessened if a general, long-term 
setting is a qualification for its operation. They attempt 
to narrow the focus of the agenda-setting theory to par­
ticular political events by studying the campaign visit of 
President Gerald Ford to Oklahoma City in 1974. Coverage 
of the event in newspapers and on radio and television was 
monitored and analyzed. A random sample of 166 subjects
26
were interviewed by telephone in the 72-hour period follow­
ing the event and were asked an open-ended question concern­
ing what issues the President had stressed in his speech.
In addition, the subjects were questioned concerning their 
sources of information about the event. Correlations were 
moderate (+.64), but not statistically significant between 
the combined media agenda and the agenda of issues recalled 
by the public. Correlations between specific media and 
public issue agendas ranged from +.53 to +.62, but again 
were not significant. However, the issue agenda of the 
subjects who received information about the event from more 
than one medium correlated at +.79 (p. .05) with the media 
agenda. Although no widespread support was found for the 
hypothesis that the agenda-setting theory is operant in a 
specific event, correlations are high enough to suggest that 
the subject warrants further investigation.
Summary
In the studies cited above, a good deal of support 
has been reported for the existence of some type of relation­
ship between the media's coverage of issues and the public's 
perception of which issues are important. Two major ques­
tions remain unanswered concerning the agenda-setting hypo­
thesis, however. First, in which direction is the rela­
tionship? The media may set the public's agenda, or the 
knowledge of public interests may dictate which issues the 
media cover. Secondly, is the agenda-setting function
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operant only with issues of very broad, national concern, 
or does it apply to specific events?
This study will investigate the question of the 
media's ability to set the public's agenda in the situation 
of a specific political event. It will differ from past 
research in its narrower focus of time and its use of a 
field experimental design. If a relationship is found, the 
before-after measurement of public issue agenda should 
verify the direction of the relationship.
Hypotheses :
H,: "Exposure to a single televised political
broadcast will result in a significant change 
in public issue agenda in the direction of the 
stimulus agenda."
Hr : "The post-test agenda for viewers will be more
closely correlated with the stimulus agenda 
than will be the post-test agenda for non­
viewers . "
Uses and Gratifications
In the move away from the question "what do the 
media do to the audience," the question has become "what do 
the audience do with the media?" (Katz). Although gratifi­
cation research was present to some extent in the earliest 
empirical studies, its recent resurgence indicates a 
definite shift in perspectives. Katz, Blumler, and Gurevitch 
(1973) state that modern gratification research may be char­
acterized by (1) the social and psychological origins of 
(2) needs which generate (3) expectations of (4) the mass
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media or other sources, which lead to (5) differential 
patterns of media exposure (or engagement in other activi­
ties) , resulting in (6) need gratifications and (7) other 
consequences, perhaps mostly unintended ones.
The basic set of assumptions on which past uses and 
gratification research has been done is outlined by Lundberg 
and Huiten (1974). First, an active audience is assumed.
Media consumption is goal directed, not completely passively 
encountered. The audience mediates any direct effects, and 
part of this mediation lies in the audience needs and result­
ing media exposure. In addition, the media compete with other 
means of gratification of audience needs. Because of the 
view of man as an actor with some degree of rationality, 
self report is seen as a useful and valid means of gathering 
data.
From the definition given by Katz, Blumler and 
Gurevitch, and based on the assumptions outlined by Lundberg 
and Huiten, research may be directed at several areas of 
investigation. Possibilities include typologies of audience 
gratifications (psychological needs), source of media grati­
fication (whether content, exposure, or social content), 
attributes of individual media which make them adequate for 
specific need satisfactions, versatility of sources of 
gratification, and interaction of the use with the effect. 
Although much is offered for examination which concerns media 
functions and non-effect oriented research, the uses and
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gratifications paradigm obviously offers in addition ano­
ther means of getting at the problem of effects. Although 
the general assumptions of the functionalist position still 
hold, the function may be viewed as an intervening variable 
between the stimulus and the response.
The question of interaction of use with effect was 
present in much of the early media/violence research. Work 
by Bailyn (1959); Himmelweit, Oppenheim, and Vince (1958); 
Maccoby (1951, 1954) and others suggested that the effect of 
violent television fare on children was dependent on motiva­
tion for watching, personality, and social/physical aspects 
of the environment. A particularly thorough investigation 
was made by Schramm, Lyle, and Parker (1961) in their three- 
year research program involving children and television.
From this research they suggest probable uses of television 
by children as well as effects of television on learning, 
social relationships and behavior. Research methods 
employed are primarily in the range of field studies. In 
the process of eleven studies, most of the techniques are 
descriptive. Some field experiments are conducted to test 
hypotheses formulated in the earlier studies, but the study 
is primarily exploratory. A summary of their report sug­
gests that effects of media fare depend on the viewer's 
motivation, personality, and ability, as these effect his 
receptivity to the information and the likelihood of his 
using it. A whole series of violence research studying the
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effects of prior frustrâtion, alienation, anxiety on reac­
tion to media violence is available (Maccoby, Levin, and 
Selya, 1956; Berkowitz, 1964; Bandura, 1971; Feshbach, 1961; 
Walters and Thomas, 1963).
Other than in the tradition of media violence 
research, very little has been done concerning the role of 
audience motivation in the effects process. A 1970 study by 
Blumler, Brown and MeQuail examined the English audience of 
a long-running daytime radio serial, finding that a major 
gratification for listeners was the program's tendency to 
uphold traditional family values. Katz, Blumler, and Gure­
vitch (1973) state that this finding is a possible answer 
to the question of attitude change versus attitude reinforce­
ment through the media; it depends in part upon whether the 
listener is seeking reinforcement.
The question of gratification and effects has also 
been studied by Kline, Miller and Morrison (1974) in a 
media campaign concerning family planning information. The 
authors conducted a field experiment in two midwestern 
American cities ; one serving as the experimental group, the 
other as the control. After interviews with a random sample 
of respondents in each city, the experimental group 
received a campaign of radio messages aimed at an adoles­
cent audience. The control group received no treatment.
After the campaign, interviews were again conducted with 
each original sample as well as with an independent sample
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in each city. Total n size was 600. Specific need states 
in the audience are posited to be associated with differen­
tial effects from mass media. The effects are seen to be 
gratifications of the need states.
The state of need of subjects for family planning 
information are suggested to be dependent upon age and sex, 
as well as the individual's orientation toward his primary 
group. Questions were asked which determined how much knowl­
edge each subject had relative to the information held by 
his relevant referent group. Need states of congruent. 
incongruent (ahead). and incongruent (behind) were estab­
lished. Interpersonal discussion is further suggested to 
contribute to effects, so each need state is divided into 
a "talking" and "non-talking" group. Effects of these 
independent variables on knowledge and message discrimina­
tion are measured. Analysis indicates that subjects in the 
congruent and behind states as well as those in the nontalk­
ing condition gained information from the campaign. The 
adolescents in these conditions had not reached the point 
at which it was difficult to add new information. The 
aheads and talkers had already reached this point, and 
therefore did not gain at the same rate as the others.
In a discussion of the meaning of their findings, Kline, 
Miller and Morrison (1974) state that the traditional 
mass communication reports of "no significant effects" is 
inaccurate because of lack of consideration of relevant
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dependent variables. The needs of people were shown in this 
study to enhance or inhibit media effects. Although no 
significant effects of knowledge were apparent in the over­
all analysis, control for need states indicate their medi­
ating effects.
The study of political uses of media during cam­
paigns is another area in which study of the relationship 
of gratification and effects has been neglected, according 
to Garrett O'Keefe (1975). Although several studies have 
considered functions of media during election campaigns, 
O'Keefe states that the extent to which early-sought gratifi­
cations are fulfilled by mass media and other communication 
sources over the campaign should be investigated. He sug­
gests the possibility that anticipation of using the media 
for surveillance may yield greater learning during the time 
of the campaign.
A 1969 study by Blumler and McQuail used the context 
of the 1964 British general elections to study the gratifi­
cations people derive from media consumption and the uses to 
which the materials are put. The authors were also concerned 
with the problem of how the persuasiveness of a political 
message depends, if it does, upon an individual's motivation 
for receiving it. A set of eight items suggesting reasons 
for watching political broadcasts and nine items represent­
ing reasons people avoid the broadcasts were developed from 
prior interviews with groups of voters in the area. In the
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study, respondents were asked to indicate which items applied 
to them, and strength of motivation was determined by a com­
parison of reasons for watching with reasons for avoiding. 
Strength of motivation was shown to be related to the num­
ber of broadcasts the voters reported viewing during the cam­
paign and to interact with campaign exposure in affecting 
knowledge gain and shift in party attitudes during the cam­
paign.
Mendelsohn and O'Keefe (1975) employed a uses- 
gratifications approach to study the relationship of mass 
communications behaviors in voter decision-making. The 
event studied was the 1972 presidential election, and panel 
data was collected over a four month period before and after 
the election. A final sample of 618 potential voters 
received all five interviews in the Summit County, Ohio, 
area. Results of the study indicate that the subjects may 
be broken down into five major groups behaviorally. People 
who make a decision early in the election to refrain from 
voting are for the most part unexposed to campaign media and 
are therefore not subject to campaign influence. Others 
intend to vote, but for various reasons fail to do so.
Persons who decide early in the election to vote for a 
particular candidate seem to limit their own use of the media 
for information gain, and therefore hold dogmatically to 
their initial position. They may be exposed to counter­
propaganda, but since they are already committed and do not
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anticipate media influence, there is little possibility of 
conversion. Three-fourths of all voters interviewed in this 
study fell into this category. Voters who decide to support 
a candidate but change their minds at some point in the cam­
paign tend to report low political interest, moderate atten­
tion to the campaign, but high anticipated and reported 
influence of the media on their voting decisions. Similar 
to this group are voters who decided on their choice late 
in the campaign; these people were highly exposed to several 
sources of influence including the media, but were less 
likely than the "switchers" to anticipate media influence. 
Thus it would seem that those voters most likely to be influ­
enced by the media are those who have low political interest 
and have made a tentative commitment or none at all, and 
expose themselves to various kinds of media influence whether 
or not that influence was anticipated.
McLeod and Becker (1974) attempt to test the validity 
of self-report measures used by Blumler and McQuail (1969) 
as well as examine additive effects of gratification and 
avoidance in media use. Again using the 1972 presidential 
election, the authors construct a very broad study, the 
partial purpose of which is to identify media effects from 
gratifications. Personal interviews were conducted with 356 
respondents before and after the election. The sample was 
stratified according to voter age and education. Measures 
were taken of media exposure, gratifications and avoidances.
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and political effects. Exposure measures included number 
of hours watching television per evening, kind of programs 
watched, and time spent watching public affairs programs. 
Gratification/avoidance measures were those used by Blumler 
and McQuail with some variation to fit the American political 
situation. Political effects measures included in the pre­
test are issue accuracy, probability of voting, interest in 
the campaign, campaign activity, convention viewing, adver­
tisement viewing, selectivity in vote prediction, and per­
ceived differences between candidates. Political effects 
measures on the post-election interviews include accuracy 
of recall of vote outcome, political discussion, election 
night media use, campaign special viewing, selectivity in 
special viewing, and voting intent change. Controll 
for several media-connected variables (general political 
interest, political media dependence) was established.
Results of the study analysis indicate that even 
with exposure variables held constant in regression analysis, 
gratification and avoidance dimensions were able to explain 
significant amounts of additional variance in over half the 
comparisons. The authors suggest that although they have 
shown additive effects of gratifications and avoidances in a 
linear regression mode, there remains a need to examine 
possible interactive effects of combining two gratification 
dimensions or a gratification and avoidance dimension.
Also, theoretically, there is high possibility of an
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interaction effect between a specific message and the grati­
fication sought at the time of that message. Further study 
in this area is suggested.
Summary
The work in the uses and gratifications paradigm 
has resulted primarily in descriptions of audience typolo­
gies, sources of media gratification, and functions served 
by the media. The question of the relationship of the use 
to the effect is suggested by several authors as necessary 
for future research, although only one study (Blumler and 
McQuail, 1969) attempts to test for the interaction. The 
positive results of that study, coupled with reports from 
the media/violence literature indicating similar interactive 
possibilities, suggest that a study of that relationship 
could contribute significantly to scientific knowledge of 
media effects.
Hypotheses :
Hg: "Respondents who watched the broadcast for
'personality' reasons will evaluate the candi­
date significantly higher after viewing the 
program than will respondents who watched for 
other reasons."
Hy: "Respondents who watched to gain issue informa­
tion will be able to recall significantly more 
issues than will respondents who watched for 
other reasons,"
37
Chap ter Summary 
In examining the question "what are the effects of 
the media?" and particularly "what are the effects of a 
political media message?", it is imperative that one pursue 
an eclectic approach to such a broad issue. To insist upon 
one research concern (e.g., agenda-setting) to the exclusion 
of others is to fail to recognize the complementary aspects 
of the approaches. To insist that the question of media 
effects has been answered is to deny recent contradictory 
research and to overlook social, cultural, and political 
change which may mitigate the findings of earlier studies.
It is the proposal of this study that the three 
major areas of research in current mass communication study 
are not contradictory, but rather contribute to a functional 
model of mass communication effects. Adapting the Stinchcombe 
model and applying the concepts of the research in agenda- 
setting, uses and gratifications, and direct effects, one 
might propose the following inter-relationship:
"H", or the individual seeks out much of the stimuli 
("S") which affects it. "H"'s reason for seeking the stim­
ulus will determine in part its effect on him. At other 
times, unsolicited stimuli ("T") reach the individual, and 
the effects of those stimuli may include attitude change, 
information gain, the establishment of an issue agenda, etc. 
However, if "H" tends to seek out those "S's" which maintain 
it, the possibilities for effect by "T" is lessened.
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To determine whether the correlation of these aspects 
of research may contribute to knowledge of the effects of a 
single televised political advertisement, seven hypotheses 
will be tested:
Restatement of Hypotheses
H^: "There will be a significant change in attitude
toward the speaker as a result of exposure to 
the televised political commercial."
Hg: "Respondents who are initially predisposed
toward Reagan will be more likely to watch the 
broadcast than those respondents who are not 
predisposed toward Reagan."
H,: "A significantly greater number of Republicans
than Democrats will watch the broadcast."
H^: "Exposure to a single televised political
broadcast will result in a significant change 
in public issue agenda in the direction of the 
stimulus agenda."
Hg: "The post-test agenda for viewers will be more
closely correlated with the stimulus agenda 
than will be the post-test agenda for non­
viewers . "
Hg: "Respondents who watched the broadcast for
'personality' reasons will evaluate the candi­
date significantly higher after viewing the 
program than will respondents who watched for 
other reasons." .
Hy: "Respondents who watched to gain issues informa­
tion will be able to recall more issues than 
will respondents who watched for other reasons."
CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY
Chapter three will discuss procedures, data- 
gathering instruments, design, and data analysis.
Procedures
To test the research hypotheses previously outlined, 
this study will employ a quasi-experimental field procedure 
using a single televised political message as the stimulus. 
The message chosen was a 25-minute campaign speech by Ronald 
Reagan, a major competitor for the Republican nomination in 
the 1976 presidential election (text of the speech is inclu­
ded in Appendix C). The message was broadcast at 8:00 p.m. 
in the state of Texas on Wednesday, April 29, 1975, just 
prior to the Texas primary on Saturday, May 2, of the same 
week (The Texas Republican Party eventually gave all 100 
delegate votes to Reagan at the Republican National Conven­
tion) . The speech itself was a replay of a live speech 
given by Reagan while campaigning in Texas, and while not 
heavily advertised, was listed in the television schedule 
of the local newspapers.
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This particular speech was chosen for use as the 
stimulus for several reasons. First, it had a single 
exposure on television, providing some of the control neces­
sary for a before-after design. In addition it was widely 
available in the area, being broadcast statewide. Thirdly, 
since Reagan was a serious competitor for the Republican 
nomination in Texas, a presentation of several of his issue 
positions aired so close to the Texas primary had high likeli­
hood of attracting local interest. This significantly 
increased the value of the speech as stimulus material. 
Finally, very little research has been done using any poli­
tical advertisements other than "spot" commercials. This 
25-minute program provided a test of political programs 
containing substantive issue information.
On Monday (April 27) and Tuesday (April 28) evenings 
before the speech was aired, trained student interviewers 
administered a pre-test by telephone to 100 subjects above 
voting age in the residential section of Dallas, a large 
southwest metropolitan area.* Subjects were selected by
j *A1though the sample size is average for laboratory
i experiments, it is fairly small for survey research. Since
j the methodology of this study is somewhat a combination of
I the two methods, adequate sample size is questionable.
! According to Simon (1969) , the strength of a relationship
1 is the same regardless of the sample size, although a small
I  sample will yield a less accurate estimate of the strength
1 than will a large sample. However, if only a very faint
' relationship exists between 2 variables, the relationship
would appear significant in a large sample, but not in a 
small sample because the chance variation of a small sample 
masks the effect. Therefore, error produced by small sample 
size will be Type XI.
4 1
random generation of numbers, using the Dallas area prefixes. 
Prefixes reserved for downtown businesses were excluded. A 
series of four digit numbers drawn from a table of random 
numbers was attached to each prefix. (For discussion of 
this procedure, see Hauck and Cox, 1974.) The same subjects 
were given a post-test by telephone interview in the three 
days following the televised speech (April 30, May 1, May 2).
Pre-test
In addition to general demographic information, the 
pre-test sought to determine a) the agenda of issues held by 
subjects, and b) attitudes toward Ronald Reagan as measured 
by a 12-item semantic differential scale. Other information 
concerning interest in the election, political party affili­
ation, and current preference for the Republican nomination 
was included.
Post-test
After the broadcast of the speech, post-tests were 
administered to determine a) viewing behavior, b) reasons for 
watching or not watching, c) agenda of issues held by sub­
jects, d) attitudes toward Reagan (as measured by a 12-item 
semantic differential scale), and e) recall of issues and 
positions supported by Reagan in the speech.
Sample
Final sample consisted of 89 subjects who were con­
tacted in both the pre-test and post-test. (For sample
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description, see Appendix D.) The remaining ten subjects 
could not be re-contacted in the post-test. After the post­
test, subjects were divided into comparison groups on the 
basis of whether they watched or failed to watch the program. 
Final sample distribution was as follows :
Group I: 30 (watched program)
Group II: 59 (did not watch program)
Respondents were told at the beginning of the pre-test 
that they were being asked to participate in a political 
survey not sponsored by any particular candidate. Exact 
wording was as follows :
Hello, I'm a student at the University of Oklahoma and 
I'm conducting a survey on the 1976 presidential elec­
tion as part of class project. I am not affiliated with 
any political party or candidate, but I'd like to ask 
you a few questions about some of the candidates and 
issues.
Data-Gathering Instruments 
A survey questionnaire to be conducted by telephone 
was prepared to collect measurable data on the variables 
to be studied (see Appendices A and B for exact wording of 
questionnaires). The questionnaire included:
1. A semantic differential to measure candidate 
image. The semantic differential used in this study is a 
12-item, five point scale consisting of dichotomous adjective 
pairs (exact scales are in the appendix). The scale has 
been successfully used in actual political campaign situa­
tions to test candidate image (Russell, 1971; Hirsch, 1972;
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Kaid and Hirsch, 1973; and Miller and Jackson, 1973). It 
was derived from a 29-item semantic differential administered 
to 626 subjects in a statewide sample in Texas in 1968.
The scales measured the subjects' images of the ideal governor 
and images of the Democratic and Republican candidates for 
that office. Data were collapsed and factor analyzed. The 
12 scales used in this study are the scales with the highest 
loadings.
2. Agenda of Issues. The agenda of issues was 
determined by the question "What do you think are the most 
important issues in the election?" This sort of open-ended 
question is the type used in most agenda-setting research 
and is described by McCombs (1972, 1975). Although some 
agenda-setting research has asked subjects to rank-order 
five or six issues, this method is chosen to avoid supplying 
the subj ect with an agenda he may not already have. Another 
approach, that of having the subjects select and rank five 
or six issues from a list of 20 or more issues is not prag­
matic given the circumstance of the data collection, i.e., 
the telephone survey.
3. Reasons for watching and not watching were 
established by an adaptation of the scales used by Blumler 
and McQuail (1969) in their uses and gratification research 
(copy is in appendix). For each of several reasons sug­
gested, the respondent is asked to determine whether that 
reason applies to him "a lot," "a little," or "not at all."
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4. Recall of issues discussed by speaker. Sub­
jects' recall of issues was determined by the question "What 
issues do you recall Reagan stressing in his speech?"
Data Analysis
The research hypotheses were tested as follows, with 
significance level set at .05 for all questions:
Hypothesis 1 (Change in attitude toward Reagan)-- 
The twelve-item semantic differential was used to measure 
candidate evaluation before and after the message for both 
viewers and non-viewers. An overall mean for each subject 
was obtained by summing the ratings on each scale of the 
semantic differential. Mean scores for each group (view­
ers , non-viewers) on both pre-test and post-test were 
tabulated and compared using a t-test.
Hypothesis 2 (relationship of pre-tests attitudes
toward Reagan to viewing behavior)--Mean ratings on the five
point semantic differential were categorized "high" or "low"
for all subjects according to whether their mean score was
above or below the group mean. Viewers and non-viewers
were compared at both levels by means of a chi square 
2
(x ) for independence of variables.
Hypothesis 3 (frequency of Republicans versus Demo­
crats who watched the broadcast)--Significance of frequency 
differences were determined by x^.
Hypotheses 4. 5 (change of agenda of issues)-- 
Aggregate agendas of issues for pre-test and post-test were
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established by a frequency count of Issues mentioned by 
viewers and non-viewers. Content analysis of the stimulus 
material was conducted to establish an agenda of issues for 
the Reagan speech, using the sentence as the unit of analysis. 
A panel of judges analyzed the material independently (using 
the sentence as the unit of analysis) by frequency of mention 
of each of six items established from the respondents' 
agendas. Intercoder reliability was complied at .88.
Specific correlations were determined by the Spearman Rho 
test for association.
Hypotheses 6. 7 (relationship of reason for watching 
to stimulus effect)--Reasons for watching the Reagan broad­
cast were divided into two broad categories; (1) personal­
ity, or image reasons, and (2) issue, or informational 
reasons. The semantic differential scale used in the study 
was designed to tap candidate image, so it was used as the 
measure of respondent reactions to the candidate as a person. 
The mean score of the post-test semantic differential was 
computed for respondents who said they watched "a lot" for 
the purpose of "getting to know Reagan better as a person".
A mean score on the same scale was computed for a group 
comprised of those who watched "to get to know Reagan better 
as a person" "a little" and "not at all." Mean scores were 
compared by means of a t-test. For the second category 
(issue reasons for watching, levels of application were 
compared to number of item recalled (0, 1, 2, 3 or more)
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from the Reagan speech, using x . Distribution of cells 
was uneven, however, invalidating the analysis. Number 
of issues recalled was collapsed into two categories, 0, 
and one or more, and significance of difference was deter­
mined by Fisher's Exact Test.
CHAPTER IV
RESULTS
This chapter presents data collected in the study 
and statistical analysis of that data according to the 
methods described in the preceding chapter.
H^: There will be a significant change in attitude
toward the speaker as a result of exposure to 
the televised political commercial.
Results of the tests of H^ are reported in Tables 
I and II.
Table I presents the comparison of candidate evalu­
ation mean scores of viewers and non-viewers at both pre­
test and post-test. Pre-test mean of viewers on the semantic 
differential scale was 3.84, and pre-test mean of non­
viewers was 3.86. Post-test mean of viewers was 3.77, and 
post-test mean for non-viewers was 3.90. A correlated t- 
test showed that neither difference was statistically sig­
nificant (alpha = .05).
4 7
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TABLE I 
Viewers Vs. Non-viewers
Comparison of Candidate Evaluation Mean Scores
Mean t-value d.f. Prob.
Pre-test
Viewers
Non-viewers
3.84
3.86
-0.13 51.94 .45
Post-test
Viewers 
Non-viewers
3.77
3.90
-1.08 52.92 .14
Table II reports change in candidate evaluation mean 
scores from pre-test to post-test for both viewers and non­
viewers. For viewers, the pre-test mean score on the seman­
tic differential was 3.84. Post-test mean was 3.77. A t- 
test indicates the difference is not significant (alpha = 
.05). The non-viewer pre-test mean was 3.86, and the post­
test mean was 3.90. Again, there is no significant differ­
ence. The results do not support Hypothesis 1.
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TABLE II
Change
Viewers Vs. Non-viewers 
in Candidate Evaluation Mean Scores
Mean t-value d.f. Prob .
Viewers
Pre-test 3.84
-0.85 29 .20
Post-test 3.77
Non-viewers
Pre-test 3.86
-0.78 58 .23
Post-test 3.90
Hg: 'Respondents who are initially predisposed
toward Reagan will be more likely to watch 
the broadcast than those respondents who are 
not predisposed toward Reagan.”
Table 111 presents the number of viewers who rated 
Reagan "high" and the number rating him "low" on the seman­
tic differential compared to the number of non-viewers 
rating him "high" and the number rating him low. (The 
"high" group consists of those respondents who rated 
Reagan above the mean of the entire sample; the low group 
includes those who rated him below the sample mean.) Of 
those who rated Reagan high on the pre-test semantic dif­
ferential, 34 did not watch and 16 did watch the program.
Of those respondents who rated Reagan low on the pre-test 
scale, 25 did not watch the program and 14 did watch.
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The relationship between the evaluation of the candidate and 
subsequent viewing behavior does not reach significance 
level (x^ = 0.02559). Thus is not supported.
TABLE III
Effect of Prior Evaluation on Exposure
High Evaluation 
(Above 3.85)
Low Evaluation 
(Below 3.86)
Did Not Watch
Program 34 25
57.6% 42.4%
68.0% 64.1%
Did Watch
Program 16 14
53.3% 46 . 7%
32 .0% 35.9%
X = 0.02559 d.f. = 1 (n.s.d.)
A significantly greater number of Republicans 
than Democrats will watch the broadcast.
Table IV presents results of a complex chi square 
test for relationship between political party preference 
(Republican, Democrat, or Independent) and viewing behavior. 
Of 27 respondents who listed the Republican party as their 
preference, 10 watched the program, 17 did not. Of the 27 
respondents preferring the Democrat party, 5 watched, 22 
did not. A total of 35 respondents considered themselves 
Independent ; 15 of these watched the program, 20 did not.
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Findings are not statistically significant (x^ = 4,23277). 
Successive simple chi square tests indicated that although 
Republicans were no more likely to view the program than 
were Democrats (x^ = 2.3) or Independents (x^ = .2108), 
Independents were significantly more likely to watch than 
Democrats (x^ = 4.1316, p<.05). was not supported.
TABLE IV
Effect of Partisan Identification on Exposure
Republican Democrat Independent
Did Not Watch
Program 17 22 20
28 . 8% 37.3% 33.9%
63.0% 81.5% 57.1%
Did Watch
Program 10 5 15
33 .3% 16.7% 50.0%
37.0% 18.5% 42.9%
Chi square = 4.23277 d.f. = 2 (n.s.d.)
H,: Exposure to a single televised political broadcast
will result in a significant change in public issue 
agenda in the direction of the stimulus agenda.
H„: The post-test agenda for viewers will be more
closely correlated with the stimulus agenda than 
will be the post-test agenda for non-viewers."
Results of tests of these hypotheses are presented 
in Tables V and in Figures 1 and 2. Table V presents a cor­
relation matrix of viewer, non-viewer, and stimulus agendas.
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Relationships of the agendas are illustrated in Figures 1 
and 2.
TABLE V
Correlation Matrix of Viewer and Non-Viewer 
Agendas, St imulus Agenda
Pre Pre- Pre- Post- Post- Rpapan
Viewer Viewer Nonviewer Viewer Nonviewer “
Pre-
Viewer -- +0.8800 +0.814286 +0.709523 -0.5286
Pre-
Nonviewer +0.8800 -- +0.9000* +0.94285* -0.25713
Post-
Viewer +0.814286 +0.9000* —  +0.928572*-0.0142
Pos t-
Nonviewer +0.709523 +0.94285* +0.928572* -- -0.0857
Reagan -0.5286 -0.25713 -0.0142 -0.0857
*Indicates significance (p < .05) by Spearman Rho 
correlations.
FIGURE 1 
Comparison of Viewer Agendas
+0.814286
Spearman rho correlations, n.s.
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FIGURE 2
Comparison of Non-Viewer Agendas
Pre-test -0. 25713  Reagan -0 .0857_____  Post-test
Agenda Agenda Agenda
+0.94285 (p < .05)
Spearman rho correlations.
The pre-test viewer agenda correlates with the post­
test viewer agenda at +0.814286 by Spearman Rho test for 
association. The correlation is high, though not statis­
tically significant, indicating some change as a result of 
the stimulus. When compared to the Reagan (or stimulus) 
agenda, the viewer pre-test agenda is correlated at -0.5286, 
and the viewer post-test agenda is correlated with the Reagan 
agenda at -0.0142. Neither correlation is significant, 
though the post-test is more similar to the Reagan agenda 
than is the pre-test.
The pre-test non-viewer agenda correlates signifi­
cantly (+0.94285, p < .05) with the post-test non-viewer 
agenda, indicating no change of agenda from pre-test to 
post-test. The pre-test non-viewer agenda is correlated 
with the stimulus agenda at -0.25713 (n.s.) and the post­
test agenda of non-viewers correlates with the stimulus 
agenda at -0.0857 (n.s.). Again the post-test is slightly
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more similar to the stimulus agenda than is the pre-test 
even for non-viewers. The viewer group changed more from 
pre-test to post-test than the non-viewers, and the post­
test is more closely correlated to the Reagan agenda than 
is the pre-test, though none of the correlations are signif­
icant. Results do not indicate support for either hypothesis 
at a significant level.
H,: Respondents who watched the broadcast for
"personality" reasons will evaluate the candi­
date significantly higher after viewing the 
program than will respondents who watched for 
other reasons.
Table VI presents the importance of "personality" 
reasons for watching to subsequent candidate evaluation.
The post-test semantic differential mean score for respon- 
dends who watched "a lot" for the purpose of "getting to 
know Reagan better as a person" was 3.9861. The post-test 
semantic differential mean for respondents who watched "a 
little" or "not at all" for that reason was 3.7222. A t- 
test indicates the difference is significant (p < .05). 
Hypothesis 6 is supported.
TABLE VI
Importance of "Personality" reasons for Watching to 
Candidate Evaluation
X t-value df 1-TailProbability
Group 1
Group 2 
not at
(a lot)
(a little, 
all)
3.9861
1.90
3.7222
27.56 .0335
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Hy: Respondents who watched to gain issue informa­
tion will be able to recall significantly more 
issues than will respondents who watched for 
other reasons.
Table VII presents results indicating the importance 
of "issue" reasons for watching to number of issues recalled. 
Of respondents who watched "a lot" to find out more about the 
issues, only 1 person could recall no issues. However, 13 
could recall 1 issue, 3 respondents recalled 2 issues, and 
2 recalled 3 or more. Of the 11 respondents watching either 
"a little" or "not at all" for the issue reason, 4 recalled 
no issues, 7 respondents recalled 1 issue, and no respondents 
recalled 2 or more issues.
TABLE VII
Importance to Issue Recall if "Issue" Reason for Watching
Relevance of "Issue" 
Reason for Watching
Group 1 Group 2
<• I” )
Number of issues recalled 
from Reagan's speech.
0 1 4
1 13 7
2 3 0
3 or more 2 0
Number of issues recalled from 
Reagan's speech (categories col­
lapsed to increase cell size)
0 1 4
1 or more 18 7
Fisher's Exact Test = p < .04399.
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Due to the uneven distribution of cells, categories 
had to be collapsed to subject data to statistical analysis. 
Of respondents watching "a lot" for the issue reason, 1 
could recall no issues, and 18 could recall 1 or more 
issues. Of those respondents watching "a little" or "not 
at all" for the issue reason, 4 could recall no issues, and 
7 could recall 1 or more. A Fisher's Exact Test indicates 
significant difference (p < .05). Hypothesis 7 is thus 
supported.
CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
In this chapter, data pertaining to each of the 
three research areas outlined (direct effects, agenda-setting, 
and uses/gratifientions) are discussed and combined implica­
tions for the proposed model are considered. Suggestions 
for future research are made and limitations are discussed.
Direct Effects
Attitude Change
Results of tests of the direct effects hypothesis 
indicate that exposure to the political message did not 
result in attitude change toward the speaker (see Tables I 
and II). Although the lack of significant difference in the 
pre-test mean scores of viewers and non-viewers is expected 
given a random sample, the absence of significant differ­
ence in the post-test means indicates failure to support 
the expectation that exposure to the political message would 
cause higher evaluation of the candidate than non-exposure.
Further lack of support for the direct effects 
hypothesis is evident in Table II. A non-significant t- 
test between the pre-test mean of viewers and post-test
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mean of viewers indicates that viewers did not change in 
their evaluation of Reagan as a result of viewing the broad­
cast. As expected, there was no significant difference in 
the pre-test mean and post-test mean of non-viewers.
A comparison of viewer pre-test and post-test mean 
scores on the individual scales of the semantic differen­
tial is presented in Table VIII. Significant change 
(p < .05) is indicated in the sophisticated-unsophisticated 
scale, with viewers rating Reagan significantly more sophis­
ticated after having seen his presentation (viewer pre­
mean = 3.70, post-mean = 4.03). The mean score on the calm- 
excitable scale (pre-mean = 3.50; post-mean = 3.17) and 
the saver-spender scale (pre-mean = 3.60; post-mean = 3.17) 
changed considerably, though not significantly, in the oppo­
site direction. Two of the three scales indicated 
(sophisticated-unsophisticated, calm-excitable) reflect 
personality or image concerns which were possibly affected 
by exposure. One scale, the saver-spender item, possibly 
reflects change in viewer concept of Reagan's position on 
a particular issue.
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TABLE VIII
Comparisons o£ Semantic Differential Scales for Viewers
(n=30)
Scale Pre-testMean
Post-test
Mean
t-
value
Qualified 3.77 3.77 .00
Sophisticated 3.70 4.03 -1.84*
Hones t 4.27 4.07 1.24
Serious 4.10 4.07 .19
Sincere 4.33 4.17 .90
Modern 2.87 2.73 1.07
Successful 4.10 4.37 -1.22
Handsome 3.83 3.83 .00
Friendly 4.37 4.33 .21
Conservative 3.73 3.60 .58
Calm 3.50 3.17 1.33
Saver 3.60 3.17 1.56
*Significant at .05.
Although the changes discussed are possibly due to 
exposure to the stimulus, results are questionable due to 
findings concerning non-viewer changes (see Table IX).
Change in one item (sincere-insincere) among non-viewer 
evaluations was significant (pre-mean = 4.07; post-mean = 
4.25; p < .05). Since this represents a change favorable to 
the candidate among respondents who did not hear him speak, 
some extraneous factors are likely to have influenced 
subjects' perceptions. The item analysis for non-viewers 
indicated change on two other items (modern-old fashioned, 
pre-mean = 3.53, post-mean = 3.37; saver-spender pre-mean =
50
3.58, post-mean = 3.41) although this change was not sig­
nificant .
TABLE IX
Comparisons of Semantic Differential Scales 
for Non-viewers 
(n=59)
Scale T Pre-testMean
Post-test
Mean
t-
value
Qualified
Sophisticated
Honest
Serious
Sincere
Modem
3.73 
3.86 
3.95 
3.59 
4.07 
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3.83
4.00
4.08
3.54
4.25
-1.06
-0.93
-1.16
.39
-1.90*
--------------- SuccTïs'&'ful -- 2T746 4.49 -0.38
Handsome 3.81 3.92 -1.10
Friendly 4.17 4.12 .42
Conservative 3.92 3.97 -0.38
Calm 3.71 3.85 -1.07
Saver 3.58 3.41 1.32
*Significant at .05.
Again, occurrence of these changes among non-viewers 
indicates other causal factors. The fact that the study 
was conducted during the week preceding the Texas primary 
suggests information from other media sources as a possible 
explanation. Support or non-support for this suggested 
explanation is not available from the data.
61
However, other variables which may have intervened 
can be examined. A point which should be considered in the 
explanation process is whether non-viewers were higher media 
consumers in general than viewers. To gain some indication 
of the relationship of general media use to viewing beha­
vior, viewers and non-viewers were compared by number of 
hours per day they reported viewing television and by their 
primary source of information about the presidential elec­
tion .
Results indicate that 60 per cent of those who 
watched the program reported watching more than three hours 
of television per day. Of non-viewers, 42.3 per cent watched 
3 or more hours per day. Although a chi square test indi­
cates no significant difference (x^ = 3.18792), viewers of 
the Reagan speech generally watched more television per day 
than non-viewers. Thus these results do not contribute to 
an explanation of the slight change among non-viewers on the 
individual semantic differential scales, since non-viewers 
were not particularly heavy viewers of the television medium.
A comparison of viewers and non-viewers by primary 
source of election information indicates, however, that only 
32.2 per cent of non-viewers received most of their election 
news from television. Another 52.5 per cent cited news­
papers as their primary source of election information.
By contrast, 50 per cent of viewers claimed television as
their primary source of election and 40 per cent cited newspapers.
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Thus, although it cannot be stated that either group 
(viewers vs. nonviewerg) are heavier users of media in 
general than the other, it is evident that viewers were 
somewhat heavier users of television for election informa­
tion, and non-viewers were somewhat heavier users of news­
papers for that purpose. Findings are not statistically 
significant, however (x^ = 2.79944).
Another possible variable to be considered is degree 
of interest in the election. If non-viewers were shown to 
be more interested in the election than viewers, it might 
be expected that information gained through that interest 
would result in'change equivalent to that caused by the 
stimulus material. Results indicate that of viewers, 3 
respondents (10%) reported "not much" interest in the elec­
tion, 8 (26.7%) said they were "somewhat interested," and 
19 (63.3%) said they were "very interested" in the election. 
Of non-viewers, 10 respondents (16.9%) were "not much" 
interested, 19 (32.2%) were "somewhat interested," and 30 
(50.8%) were "very interested." Findings are not statis-
O
tically significant (x = 1.42160). There is very little 
difference between the two groups regarding interest in 
the election. Therefore difference in interest in the 
election did not affect attitude change.
In general, the tests of attitude change indicate 
no direct effects of the stimulus material. Although there 
is some change evident in both viewer and non-viewer groups
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on the individual semantic differential items, these results 
do not seem to be due to differences among the groups on 
either amount of media use, primary media source, or inter­
est in the election.
Selective Exposure
The results reported in Table III indicate no signif­
icant relationship between the evaluation of the candidate 
and subsequent viewing behavior. Respondents who rated 
Reagan high on the pre-test semantic differential were no 
more likely to watch the program than respondents whose 
initial evaluation of Reagan was low. Therefore, although 
there were no direct effects of the political message on 
attitude, the lack of effect was not produced by the selec­
tive exposure traditionally held at least partially responsi­
ble for the lack of media influence. A possible explanation 
is that the before-after measures employed in the study 
controlled the possibility of the "de facto" selectivity 
previously discussed (p. 14) and often reported in field 
studies. Thus, any selective■exposure found would seem to 
indicate real preference for supportive information, and 
this is not indicated by the data.
A second possible explanation is that the stimulus 
used is a single political message rather than the series 
of messages or entire campaign communication often studied. 
Selective exposure has not been consistently found to be
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operant in one-time political messages and is certainly not 
supported by the data in this study.
In addition, the concept of selective exposure 
according to partisan identification fails to be supported, 
as Table XV indicates. Although it was expected that 
respondents initially predisposed toward Reagan because of 
partisan affiliation would be more likely to watch the broad­
cast than those not so predisposed toward Reagan, an initial 
complex chi-square test showed no relationship between 
political party preference (Republican, Democrat, or Inde­
pendent) and viewing behavior. Simple chi squares showed 
a slight distinction. Republicans were no more likely to 
view the program than were Democrats or Independents, so 
Hg was not confirmed. However, Independents were signifi­
cantly more likely to watch than Democrats. These data 
provide further confirmation for the absence of selective 
exposure.
If viewed in light of the selective exposure concept, 
one would expect Republicans to be most likely to view, then 
Independents, and Democrats the least likely. It tradition­
ally has been reported that those most likely to expose 
themselves to political messages are those least likely 
to be affected because they have already taken a position. 
Traditionally, too, the converse is true: those who have
not taken a position are those least likely to be exposed 
to a political message. The findings of this study indi­
cate the opposite. Independents were significantly more
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likely than Democrats to watch, and were more likely to 
watch than Republicans, though not significantly. In addi­
tion, Independents comprise a larger per cent of the sample 
than either Democrats or Republicans.
Therefore, although there were no direct effects of 
viewing on attitude change, this lack of change is not 
attributable to selective exposure, since neither predispo­
sition toward the candidate nor political party (Republican, 
Democrat) affected viewing behavior. Thus, viewers did not 
seek stimuli which "maintained" or reinforced them.
Agenda-Setting 
The agenda-setting paradigm was used in this study 
as a means of examining effects of political media exposure 
on a type of information gain. Viewers were expected to 
change the agenda of issues they believed to be important 
in the direction of the agenda of issues presented in the 
stimulus. Support of the agenda-setting hypothesis would 
have indicated some effects of media on either information 
gain, or more specifically, on salience of particular issues.
Results of statistical tests (presented in Table V 
and Figures 1 and 2) show a significant correlation between 
pre-test and post-test agendas for non-viewers, while the 
correlation between pre-test and post-test agendas for 
viewers is high but not significant. This indicates that 
there was some change in viewers' agenda as a result of 
exposure to the message, and almost no change for those
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respondents who did not see the program. However, when 
the Spearman correlation is computed between the respon­
dents ' agendas and the agenda of the stimulus, only nega­
tive correlations occurred. The pre-test agenda of non­
viewers correlates negatively with the Reagan agenda, and 
the post-test is slightly less negatively correlated. The 
pre-test agenda of viewers is negatively correlated with 
the Reagan agenda and the post-test agenda is less nega­
tively correlated. The correlations are not significant, 
although the viewers' agenda changed more than the non­
viewer agenda. Thus although the issue agendas for both 
viewers and non-viewers were very different from the agenda 
stressed by the Reagan speech, both groups moved somewhat 
in the direction of the Reagan agenda (see Figures 1 and 2). 
The non-viewer group changed only slightly (from -0.25714 
to -0.0857) while the viewers changed moderately (from 
-0.5428 to -0.0142). The viewer change should be attri­
butable to exposure to the stimulus material, while the 
slight non-viewer change may be due to a number of external 
factors (e.g., other media sources, interpersonal dis­
cussions, personal circumstances). While there is no 
statistically significant support for the agenda-setting 
hypotheses, the results are in the direction expected.
More of the relationships present can be observed 
by fitting the correlations into a cross-lag correlation 
diagram. Figure 3 shows that the effect seems to be
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that viewers' agendas seemed to move in the direction of 
non-viewer agendas. The pre-test viewer agenda was cor­
related with the pre-test non-viewer agenda at +0.8800, 
and the post-test viewer agenda correlated with the post­
test non-viewer agenda at +0.928572 (p < .05). However, 
since the non-viewer agenda was initially more closely 
correlated with the Reagan agenda (-0.25713) than was the 
viewer agenda (-0.5286), it is reasonable that the change 
is in that direction. The agendas of viewers and non­
viewers at the final measure point were approximately the 
same in relation to the Reagan agenda (viewers, -0.0142; 
non-viewers, -0.0857), but the starting point was different. 
A possible interpretation of this is that agenda change 
occurred among information seekers (those who watched) 
although that change did not bring their agendas into 
close correlation with the stimulus agenda due to the 
extreme distance between the agendas at the first measuring 
point. An empirical test of this possibility is not feasi­
ble from the data, however.
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FIGURE 3
Correlations of Viewer, Non-Viewer, and Reagan Agendas
+0.814286
Pre-Viewers ---  Reagan Agenda    Poat^Viewers
+0.8800 ^ +0.92^572*
Pre-Nonviewers-------- Reagan Agenda -----^^^^ost-Nonviewers
I____________________________________________________________________ !
+0.94285*
■^Indicates significance (p < .05) by Spearman rho 
correlations.
A particular problem in the research is that tests 
for rank-order data tend to be tests of association rather 
than tests of difference, or change. The findings would 
be considerably more important if one could test for sig­
nificant difference among agenda correlations. A possible 
solution for further research would be the fitting of the 
correlations into a cross-lagged correlation, or some other 
form of time-order series.
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Uses and Gratifications
Personality, or Image
From the uses and gratifications perspective, this 
study proposed that the effects of the media are dependent 
in part upon the use of the media by the consumer. 
Respondents who watched purposefully for personality reasons 
should respond to "image” impressions by the stimulus mes­
sage. Those who watched for issues reasons would be more 
likely to be affected in the area of issue information gain.
The results of the uses and gratifications hypo­
theses can be better understood if placed in the perspec­
tive of overall reasons for viewing and not viewing. Table 
X presents reasons viewers watched the program. The reason 
"getting to know the candidate better as a person" was a 
major reason for watching for 20 per cent of the sample. 
Another 36.5 per cent said it was "not at all" a factor.
"To get information on the issues in the campaigrf'was "a 
lot" the reason for viewing for 63.3 per cent of the view­
ers . Also, 30 per cent of the viewers claimed to have 
watched "a lot" for the purpose of getting assistance in 
making a voting decision.
By self-report, reinforcement was a strong motiva­
tion for watching the program, as 43.3 per cent stated that 
they watched "a lot" to remind themselves of their candi­
date's strong points. Also, 43.3 per cent watched "a lot" 
because the program "came on while they were watching
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television," although 50 per cent of the viewers stated that 
this was "not at all" a reason they viewed the program.
TABLE X
Reasons for Watching the Program
A Lot A Little Not at All
1. To get to know Reagan 
better as a person. 6 (20%) 13 (43.3%) 11 (36.6%)
2. To get more informa­
tion on the issues in 
the campaign. 19 (63.3%) 6 (20%) 5 (16.6%)
3. To find out Reagan's 
qualifications. 10 (33.3%) 10 (33.3%) 10 (33.3%)
4. To help me decide 
who to vote for. 9 (30%) 8 (26.6%) 13 (43.3%)
5. To get ammunition to 
use in discussions 
of the election with 
others. 9 (30%) 3 (10%) 16 (53.3%)*
6. To enjoy the excite­
ment of the presi­
dential race. 3 (10%) 11 (36.6%) 10 (33.3%)
7. To remind me of my 
candidate's strong 
points 13 (43.3%) 9 (30%) 8 (26.6%)
8. It came on while I 
was watching tv. 13 (43.3%) 2 (6.6%) 15 (50%)
on
*Information is missing from 
this particular item.
the data in two cases
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Table XI presents reasons of non-viewers for not 
watching the broadcast. Of the non-viewers, 42.3 per cent 
indicated that a very important ("a lot") reason for not 
watching the program was that they did not know the program 
was on. No other reasons for not watching were cited by 
more than 13.5 per cent of non-viewers as a major reason 
for their failure to view. Conflict with other television 
shows was "not at all" a reason for not watching for 64.4 
per cent of non-viewers. Also 71.1 per cent indicated that 
although they did not watch the program, the reason was 
"not at all" that they had "already made up their minds." 
Over half of the non-viewers denied any influence ("not 
at all") of each of the other reasons listed (lack of 
interest in politics, 64%; lack of trust in what politicians 
say on television, 59.3%; and preference for relaxing while 
watching television, 69.4%).
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TABLE XI
Reasons for Not Watching the Program
A Lot A Little Not at All*
1. Because I didn't know
it was on. 25 (42.3%) 9 (15.2%) 20 (33.8%)
2. Because the program 
conflicted with ano­
ther show I was watch­
ing. 8 (13.5%) 8 (13.5%) 38 (64.4%)
3. Because my mind is
already made up. 5 (8.4%) 7 (11.8%) 42 (71.1%)
4. Because I ’m not much
interested in politics. 7 (11.8%) 9 (15.2%) 38 (64.4%)
5. Because you can't 
always trust what pol­
iticians say on tv. 6 (10.1%) 13 (22%) 35 (59.3%)
6. Because I prefer to 
relax while watching
tv. 4 (6.7%) 9 (15.2%) 41 (69.4%)
*Information is missing from the data in five cases 
on all items. Therefore, 8.4% of the non-viewing sample is 
not represented.
Hypotheses 6 and 7 attempt to test the relationship 
of two of these reasons for watching to message effect. 
Results shown in Table VI indicate that the semantic dif­
ferential mean score of the group which watched "a lot" to 
"get to know Reagan better as a person" was significantly 
higher than the mean of the group watching "a little" and 
"not at all" for that reason. Thus those who watched
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primarily for personality reasons were more positive toward 
the candidate after his message than were those who watched 
for other reasons. This supports the expectation that rea­
sons for viewing relate to the effect of viewing.
There is a possibility, however, that the hypo­
thesis is not the best (or at least only) operationalization 
of the concept of relationship of use to effect. One who 
watched for personality reasons might be affected by the 
personality cues given in the stimulus, but they may not 
necessarily be positive reactions. Therefore perhaps it 
should be hypothesized that the difference in candidate 
evaluation for "personality" viewers will be significantly 
higher or lower than candidate evaluation of respondents 
who watched for other reasons, or that the change in evalu­
ation for the "personality" group should be greater than 
for the "other reasons" group. To test this, a comparison 
of change in candidate evaluation was made between respondents 
who watched the program "a lot" for the personality reason 
and respondents who watched "a little" or "not at all" for 
that reason. Mean difference on the semantic differential 
for the "a lot" group between pre-test and post-test was 
-0.1944, and mean difference for the "a little, not at all" 
group was -0.0417. Although findings were not statistically 
significant, both changes are in a negative direction. Thus 
the "personality" group did not change significantly more 
than the "other reasons" group, and the slight change was
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not in favor of the speaker. This indicates that perhaps 
those who watched for personality reasons were already more 
positive toward Reagan than those who watched for other 
reasons.
Issue, or Information
Another test of the relationship of use to effect 
concerned whether respondents who watched to gain issue 
information would be able to recall more issues than respon­
dents who watched for other reasons. To test this, the 
number of issues from the speech recalled by respondents 
who watched "a lot" to "learn more about the issues" was 
compared to the number of items recalled by respondents who 
watched either "a little" or "not at all" for that reason. 
The relationship between reasons of respondents for viewing 
and number of items recalled was significant (p < .05).
Of respondents who watched "a lot" to find out more about 
the issues, only 1 person could recall no issues, compared 
with 4 respondents in the "a little, not at all" group 
recalling no issues. A total of 18 respondents in the 
"a lot” group recalled 1 or more issues, and 7 respondents 
in the "a little, not at all" group could recall 1 or more 
issues. The interesting comparison comes, however, in 
consideration of the number of issues recalled before the 
categories were collapsed. Of those watching "a little" 
or "not at all" for the issue reason, 4 recalled no issues,
7 recalled 1 issue, and no respondents recalled more than
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1 issue. By contrast, of those respondents watching "a lot” 
for the issue reason, only 1 could recall no issues, 13 
recalled 1 issue, 3 recalled 2 issues, and 2 recalled 3 or 
more. It is obvious, then, both by the statistical test for 
significance and by examination of the categories that those 
who watched "to learn more about the issues” recalled more 
issues than did respondents who did not watch for that 
reason.
Purposive versus Non-Purposive Viewing
In light of the relationships found in Hypotheses 
6 and 7, it seemed advisable to explore other gratification 
measures more fully. In addition to the specific tests of 
the hypotheses, comparisons were made concerning the more 
general question of effects of purposive versus non-purposive 
viewing. Respondents who stated that a major (a lot) reason 
for viewing the Reagan broadcast was that "it came on while 
I was watching television" were designated non-purposive 
viewers (n=13), i.e., they did not specifically choose to 
watch. Respondents who stated that that reason was only 
"a little" or "not at all" responsible for their decision 
to view were designated "somewhat purposive" viewers (n=17). 
The two groups were compared according to number of issues 
recalled from the speech, post-mean candidate evaluation, 
and change in candidate evaluation.
P.esults of the test for issues recalled indicated 
that no one who watched non-purposefully could recall more
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than one issue, and 23.1% could recall no Issues at all.
Of the "somewhat purposive" group, 29.4% recalled more than 
one issue, and 11.8% recalled none. Due to low n size, data 
could not be subjected to statistical tests for significance.
The post-mean of non-purposive viewers on the seman­
tic differential was 3.7756, and the post-mean of "somewhat 
purposive" viewers was 3.7745. A t-test indicated no sig­
nificant difference between the two. Mean difference 
between semantic differential pre-test and post-test for 
each group was also compared. For "non-purposive viewers, 
the mean difference, or change in candidate evaluation was 
0.0321, and mean difference for "somewhat purposive viewers 
was -0.1520. A t-test showed findings are not significant.
An overview of findings of this study in the uses 
and gratification area indicates that the reasons of the 
viewer for watching seemed to intervene between message 
and the effect. Post-exposure candidate evaluation was 
significantly higher for subjects who watched "a lot" or 
"not at all" for that reason. In addition, subjects who 
watched "a lot" to learn more about the issues recalled 
considerably more issues than those who watched "a little" 
or "not at all" for those reasons, although the difference 
is not significant.
Combined Implications 
In general, after examining the effects of media on 
image (image formation or attitude change) and issue
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(information gain about the issues, change in salience of 
issues, i.e., agenda establishment or change), this study 
does not support the assumption of any substantial effect. 
There is more support for effects on issue information gain 
(as measured by the ability of the media to set the public's 
agenda in a one-time political message) than for attitude, 
or image change, although need for maintenance (selective 
exposure) is not responsible for the lack of effect.
The proposal of this study that use intervenes 
between stimulus and effect has some support and bears 
further investigation. In terms of the Stinchcombe model,
"H" does seek information from "S" as a result of some need 
motivation. His reasons, or need for watching will influ­
ence the effect of the stimulus, functioning as an interven­
ing variable between source and receiver. If a motivation 
for seeking the stimulus is need for maintenance, possibility 
of effect by "T" (unsought stimuli) is lessened. However, 
results here indicate that the need for maintenance, or 
reinforcement, was not an important reason for seeking the 
stimulus. By self-report, a large number of viewers (43.3%) 
watched the program to "remind them of their candidate's 
strong points," but the remaining 56.7 per cent of viewers 
said that such reasons affected them "a little" or "not at 
all." The measures of attitude change showed selective 
exposure not at all operant in the effects process, as 
politically, those who viewed the most were those who had 
no position to maintain.
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Because of the lack of need for maintenance, and 
because 43.3 per cent of those who watched the program indi­
cated that non-purposive viewing was "a lot" responsible 
for their viewing behavior, it is obvious that "T" or 
unsought stimuli do reach "H" and have potential for image 
effects (image formation, attitude change) and issues 
effects (information gain, agenda change). Therefore one 
cannot expect "reasons for seeking" stimuli to answer the 
entire question, since much of the stimuli received is 
unsought. However, this study indicates that there was 
a great deal of purposive viewing, and that when viewing 
was done for a particular reason, the effects tended to 
correspond with that reason for viewing.
An adapted model coming as a result of this study 
might suggest the following
A Reason, or Need---
1.issue (information) 
2.image (personality)
3.reinforcement
luses)
»
issue « T
image
reinforcement
. ----- ------------
 ^ (effects^
-----^Stimulus
issue
image
reinforcement
A reason, or need, prompts H to seek a stimulus which 
will fulfill that need. The effects will correspond with the 
reasons for viewing, either positively or negatively. This 
study showed that desire for issue information was a primary
79
reason for viewing and analysis showed that those respondents 
watching "a lot" for this reason recalled more issues than 
those who watched "a little" or "not at all" for this reason. 
The overall measure of information gain, the agenda-setting 
hypotheses, indicated some positive effect, but not at a 
significant level.
A second reason for watching examined by this study 
is image, or personality reasons. When personality was "a 
lot" the reason for watching for viewers, candidate evaluation 
was significantly higher than for respondents who did not 
watch for that reason. Thus viewing for that reason pro­
duces some kind of "personality" effect. The overall test 
of attitude change in candidate evaluation as a result of 
the stimulus is not supported.
Reinforcement was not shown to be a primary reason 
for watching, as has been discussed previously.
When stimulus seeking behavior is high, possibili­
ties for effect of unsought stimuli should ba low. This 
study provides no real comparison of sought versus unsought 
stimulus, so only speculation can be made that high seeking 
behavior was responsible for the low attitude change and 
agenda change in the overall analysis.
Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
The schema outlined is merely suggested by the 
results presented here. Further study needs to be done to 
better operationalize the concepts and test the hypotheses.
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Specifically, a larger sample size would provide 
more possibilities for analysis. The sample size here has 
produced a particular problem in the uses and gratifica­
tions section of this study, as some of the analysis intended 
could not be conducted. Information is therefore descriptive 
in one case.
This study used the McLeod and Becker revision of 
the University of Leeds gratifications measures, and this 
seems a questionable instrument in light of a post hoc factor 
analysis of the reasons for watching (see Table XII). A 
varimax rotated factor matrix shows three of the reasons for 
watching loading of Factor 1, which can be labeled a com­
bined vote guidance and candidate personality factor. Rea­
sons for watching which loaded high on Factor 1 are "to get 
to know Reagan better as a person" (0.68745), "to find out 
Reagan's qualifications" (0.84404), and "to help me decide 
who to vote for" (0.77083).
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TABLE XII
Factor Analysis of Gratification Measures
Varimax Rotated Factor Matrix
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
1. To get to know Reagan 
better as a person. 0.68746* 0.12416 0.00031
2. To get more information 
on the issues in the 
campaign. 0.51403 0 . 71178* 0.00351
3. To find out Reagan's 
qualifications. 0.84404* 0.05648 0.11013
4. To help me decide who 
to vote for. 0.77083* -0 .05304 0.18178
5. To get ammunition to 
use in discussion of 
the election with others. -0.08746 -0.10103 0.67983*
6. To enjoy the excitement 
of the presidential race. 0.35750 0.27627 0.50881*
7. To remind me of my can­
didate's strong points. 0.41493 0.16011 0.51591*
8. It came on while I was 
watching tv. 0.11307 -0.78112* -0.05099
*Indicates those items which loaded highest on each
factor.
A second factor included "to get more information 
on the issues in the campaign" (0.71178) and "it came on 
while I was watching television" (-0.78112). These two 
reasons for watching seem intuitively to be opposed to
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each other, possibly at opposite extremes of some kind of 
"purposeful issue information factor." However, even though 
the factors are opposite in directionality, this interpre­
tation is merely speculative, since negatively loadings 
are usually ignored in factor analysis. Also, the reasons 
"to get more information on the issues in the campaign" 
loaded on Factor 1 at 0.51403, so perhaps it actually falls 
somewhere between the two factors.
The third factor which emerged seems to reflect a 
kind of reinforcement. It included "to get ammunition to 
use in discussions of the election with others" (0.67983),
"to enjoy the excitement of the presidential race" (0.50881), 
and "to remind me of my candidate's strong points" (0.51591).
The result of this kind of examination of the grati­
fication measure suggests that perhaps there is not equal 
opportunity to measure all three factors. A particular dis­
crepancy seems to exist between measurement of what this 
paper has called "issue" reasons and "image" reasons.
Although the uses/gratification analysis in this study 
employed only the obvious issue and image reasons for watch­
ing ("to get to know Reagan better as a person" and "to get 
more information on the issues in the campaign"), one should 
be able to make the same predictions employing all issue 
measures and all image measures. According to the factor 
analysis described, there are three measures of image, but 
only one strong measure of issue reasons. The negatively
S3
loaded reason "it came on while I was watching television" 
is difficult to interpret and cannot be considered a similar 
measure of issue. Some measures of gratification need to be 
developed which are less biased in the direction of image 
and which will give a more equal measure of reasons for 
watching.
In the overall analysis (direct effects on attitude 
and agenda change without the consideration of use as an 
intervening variable) a semantic differential was used to 
measure attitude change, and the agenda-setting paradigm was 
used to tap effects on issue or information gain. In the 
analysis involving reasons for media use, the semantic dif­
ferential measuring candidate evaluation was compared to 
personality reasons for watching, but the measure of issue 
reasons for watching are compared to items recalled from 
the speech rather than to post-viewing agendas. A more 
consistent approach to this kind of analysis would be pos­
sible if individual agendas were available for study. This 
research employed aggregate agendas (frequency of mention 
of issues by respondents) as is generally done in agenda- 
setting research. To get these individual agendas, however, 
the respondents would have to either be able to list several 
issues (many respondents in this study could only name one 
or two issues) or would have to be allowed to rank issues 
given to them by the researcher. In this latter case, 
respondents may be credited with having an agenda they did
8 4
not already have, thus making results questionable. (This 
problem is discussed by Murdoch. 1975.) An ideal solution, 
that of having respondents select and rank five or six issues 
out of a list of 25 or 30 issues, is not feasible given the 
circumstances of this research, i.e., the telephone survey. 
Cooperation of respondents in a personal interview situation 
might eliminate this problem and provide more usable data 
than the methods presently being employed.
Contributions of the Study 
The major findings of the study reported make several 
contributions to the area of mass communication research.
First, in spite of the possible qualifications out­
lined which have potential to mitigate the traditional "law 
of minimal effects" (dominance of television as a source of 
political information, contradiction of findings by experi­
mental studies, evidence for effects on image formation and 
change, declining partisan commitment, questioning of the 
selective exposure concept, and evidence of effect from 
"spot" commercials) no direct major effect of the one-time 
political exposure on candidate evaluation was observed. 
However, other findings such as lack of selective exposure, 
some agenda-setting effects, and effects related to uses 
may indicate need to continue reconsideration of its general 
application.
Secondly, the research extends the body of knowledge 
concerning selective exposure in political situations.
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finding that selective exposure was not operant either by 
general predisposition or by partisan commitment. Although 
short spot commercials are now being widely used to overcome 
the problem of selective exposure, and research reports 
that they are effective in doing so, this 25-minute program 
was not hampered by that phenomenon. Instead, more of a 
relationship existed between general media habits and likeli­
hood of viewing than between predisposition and viewing 
behavior.
Thirdly, the research contributes to the body of 
knowledge surrounding the agenda-setting concept, particularly 
in the situation of a particular political event. Like the 
few former studies in the area, this study did not find 
significant correlation of post-test agenda of viewers with 
the stimulus agenda. However, quite a large change occurred 
between pre-test and post-test of viewers' agenda in the 
direction of the stimulus agenda, although significance of 
the change cannot be determined by procedures used here. 
Interpretation of the findings suggests some agenda-setting 
among information-seekers, a concept that needs to be opera­
tionalized and tested in light of the uses and gratification 
hypotheses proposed by this study.
Fourth, the study makes a contribution in its attempt 
of an empirical test of the relation of use to effect. At 
least for "issue" and "image" reasons for watching (as 
defined by this study), the hypotheses are supported.
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The interpretations of the agenda-setting literature, added 
to these findings, suggest that function of the media for 
the consumer is an important variable in the effects process, 
a concept that has been neglected in empirical research to 
this point.
Finally, and possibly most important, this study is 
a first attempt to combine some important research perspec­
tives, trying to establish a more total research paradigm.
The study provides not only a theoretic rationale for the 
combination, but also tests for the major concerns of each 
theory within the same research project. Results indicate 
that a complementary approach is both workable and necessary 
for future research in mass communication.
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX A
PRE-TEST QUESTIONNAIRE
4.
First of all. I'd like to ask you where you get most of 
your information about the presidential election--from 
newspapers, radio, television, or other people? (mark 
only one)
other
_____newspapers  radio television  people
About how many hours a day do you watch television?
less than 1 1-2 3-4 over 4
Generally how interested would you say you are in the 
presidential election?
very interested somewhat interested not much interested
What do you think are the most important issues in the 
presidential election?
Now, I'd like to ask you a few questions about your 
reactions to Ronald Reagan. I'd like for you to rate 
him on a few scales. First, in terms of qualified--do 
you feel that he is very qualified, somewhat qualified, 
neutral. somewhat unqualified, o r very unqualified?
1 2 3 4 5
QUALIFIED
SOPHISTICATED
HONEST
SERIOUS
SINCERE
MODERN
SUCCESSFUL
HANDSOME
FRIENDLY
CONSERVATIVE
CALM
SAVER
UNQUALIFIED
UNSOPHISTICATED
DISHONEST
HUMOROUS
INSINCERE
OLD-FASHIONED
UNSUCCESSFUL
UGLY
UNFRIENDLY
LIBERAL
EXCITABLE
SPENDER
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6. Finally, I'd like to ask you just a few questions about 
yourself:
Age:_____ Education (last grade completed)__________
Sex: Male Female
Political party: Republican Democrat Independent
Who is your current preference for the Republican 
Presidential nomination?
Gerald Ford Ronald Reagan
Would it be okay if I call you back in a few days to get 
some more of your opinions?
Yes No
APPENDIX B 
POST-TEST QUESTIONNAIRE
1- First, what do you feel are the most important issues in 
the presidential election?
2. Did you happen to see Ronald Reagan's 25 minute broad­
cast at 8:00 last night (or Wednesday night)? yes no 
(If yes. go to #3; If no, go to #4)
3. I'd like to read you a list of reasons other people have 
given for watching the Reagan broadcast. For each rea­
son, would you tell me whether it applies to you a lot, 
a little, or not at all.
a lot a little not at all
_____ _____ _____ 1. To get to know Reagan bet­
ter as a person.
_____ _____  _____ 2. To get more information on
the issues in the campaign.
  _____ _____  3. To find out Reagan's
qualifications.
_____ _____ _____  4. To help me decide who to
vote for.
_____ _____ _____  5. To get ammunition to use in
discussion of the election 
with others.
_____     6. To enjoy the excitement of
the presidential race.
_____ _____  _____  7 . To remind me of my candi­
date ' s strong points.
_____ _____  _____  8. It came on while I was
watching tv.
4. I'd like to read you a list of reasons other people have 
given for not watching the Reagan broadcast. For each 
reason, would you tell me whether it applies to you a lot. 
a little, or not at all.
a lot a little not at all
  _____ _____  1. Because I didn't know it
was on.
_____ _____  _____  2. Because the program conflicted
with another show I was watching.
_____ _____  _____  3. Because my mind is already
made up.
_____ _____  _____  4. Because I'm not much inter­
ested in politics.
________  ' ' 5. Because you can't always trust
what politicians say on tv.
_____ _____  _____  6. Because I prefer to relax
while watching tv.
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Now. I'd like to ask you a few questions about your 
reactions to Ronald Reagan. I'd like for you to rate him 
on a few scales. First, in terms of qualified--do you 
feel that he is very qualified, somewhat qualified, 
neutral. somewhat unqualified, or very unqualified?
QUALIFIED
SOPHISTICATED
HONEST
SERIOUS
SINCERE
MODERN
SUCCESSFUL
HANDSOME
FRIENDLY
CONSERVATIVE
CALM
SAVER
UNQUALIFIED
UNSOPHISTICATED
DISHONEST
HUMOROUS
INSINCERE
OLD-FASHIONED
UNSUCCESSFUL
UGLY
UNFRIENDLY
LIBERAL
EXCITABLE
SPENDER
(If the respondent did not see the broadcast, go to Question 
9. Otherwise, continue. . .)
6. After watching the Reagan broadcast, do you feel you are 
more likely than before to :
a. contribute money to his campaign? yes no
b. volunteer to work for him? yes no
c. encourage others to support him? yes no
d. vote for him yourself? yes no
7. What issues do you recall Reagan stressing in his 
broadcast speech?
8. What were his positions on these issues?
9. Who is your current preference for the Republican pres­
idential nomination?
Gerald Ford Ronald Reagan
APPENDIX C 
TEXT OF POLITICAL BROADCAST
Ronald Reagan
Candidates, officials of my own support organization 
and of the Republican Party, fellow Republicans, and I know 
there have to be a great many Democrats and Independents out 
there who are aspiring to a better life. Last week on tele­
vision I listed some of the things, some of those disagree­
ments that I had with those in power. Among them my belief 
that you cannot have a solid economic recovery that the 
administration says we're having when that so-called recovery 
is based on increasing the national debt at a faster rate 
than ever in our history. We aren’t eliminating recession 
or unemployment on any lasting or permanent way. We’re 
increasing the temperature of a very sick nation with defi­
cit spending and we're trying to stop the fever by breaking 
the thermometer. The Prime Minister of England, the new 
one, a Socialist in that now almost entirely Socialist 
country, just recently said there can be no lasting improve­
ment in your living standards until it can be achieved 
without going deeper and deeper into debt. That is a 
warning from someone who has been helping lead a nation down 
the same road that we have embarked on for too many years. 
Today this country is $95 billion deeper in debt than it 
was one year ago today, and it took this country 166 years 
to accumulate a total debt of $95 billion in the middle of
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World War II. This is on top of a tax burden that is taking 
almost half of every dollar we earn. Forty-four cents is the 
tax collectors share and in your family budget how ever 
concerned you may be about inflation, this particular item 
goes up faster than any other cost and it amounts to more 
than you spend for food, shelter and clothing for your 
entire family all put together.
Now there has been an issue introduced in this cam­
paign that there are no real differences between the two 
Republican candidates. There are differences, great dif­
ferences. The inference was, however, that if you would 
accept that there were no differences then why not just say 
with the status quo. That's Latin for the less mess we're 
in. Well, I believe one of the first differences has to do 
with our different experiences in government. Mr. Ford has 
been a member of the Washington establishment for more than 
a quarter of a century. He was a congressman for that long, 
representing a single congressional district, then appointed 
Vice President by Richard Nixon and 19 months ago became 
President. I am not a part of the Washington establishment. 
I've spent most of my adult life in the private sector, but 
I have spent 8 years as governor of California. California 
if it were a nation would be the 7th ranking economic power 
in the world, but when I became Governor, California was on 
the verge of bankruptcy, insolvent and in just about the 
same condition as New York City is today, and the only 
difference between New York City and Washington, Washington
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has a printing press. I told about this on the air and I 
won't go into the actual figures and details except to tell 
you that our state was spending $1.5 million a day more than 
it was taking in and that was only one of the many financial 
problems confronting us. Well, my faith was in the people. 
As I explained on the air I wasn't quite sure how I had 
become governor. I had never intended to seek public office 
and I thought of myself as being there temporarily to repre­
sent the people against the institution of government, and 
so I turned to the people for the answers to our problems. 
For those that I could appoint to high positions in govern­
ment I sought those who did not want a career in government. 
I also turned to the people of California to the private 
sector where there was so much expertise and managerial 
skill and talent and I asked them to volunteer their efforts 
to serve in a plan that we had, and we outlined the plan. 
Enthusiastically more than 250 of them volunteered. They 
gave an average of 117 days a piece full time at no cost 
to the taxpayer, away from their jobs and their professions 
and their businesses. Organized into task forces based 
on their particular expertise they went into every area of 
state government and came back with more than 1,800 recom­
mendations as to how modern business practices could be put 
to work to make government more responsive, more efficient 
and economical. We implemented more than 1,600 of their 
recommendations, and the result was that a little over a
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year ago an incoming administration in California was the 
first in a quarter of a century to inherit a balanced budget, 
in addition a $500 million surplus, and during the 8 years 
we returned $5,761,000,000 to the people of California in 
the form of tax cuts and tax rebates,
I believe that what was done in California can be 
done at the national level, that the people of this country 
are just as willing to serve. One of the things that I have 
thought about and talked about right now was Social Security 
facing great problems, an imbalance actuarially of $2% tril­
lion. I have thought that a president of the United States 
could turn to the private sector, to the experts in pension 
and insurance and actuarial statistics, and appoint a citi­
zens ' task force while there is still time to put this pro­
gram on a sound basis so that no American need live with the 
fear that they might not someday get their payments. Inci­
dentally, when I'm about Social Security you know not too 
long ago in New Jersey on disability payments received a 
letter from Social Security telling him he was dead. He 
read it, he didn't believe it, so he went down to see them. 
There he was, talking to them. Would you believe it? They 
couldn’t argue with the computer. They couldn't figure out 
a way to reinstate his payments, so they looked at the rule 
book and they finally found a regulation that helped him for 
awhile. They gave him $700 to pay for his funeral. But 
when Washington tries to do things that are the proper
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privince of the people, that the people should be doing for 
themselves, Washington without fail is a colossal failure.
So far all the Establishment can do when they fail is come 
up with another even more expensive failure on top of the 
first one. No program ever disappears. A government pro­
gram once started is the nearest thing to Eternal Life that 
we'11 ever see on this earth. Some examples ; for 20 years 
they have been trying to build low-cost housing for the poor. 
To date their score of 3% houses destroyed for every one 
built. I was in North Carolina recently and in Gaston county 
last winter the government gave them $21,000 to buy heating 
oil for the homes of the poor who couldn't keep their homes 
warm. Now they’re trying to find out why $20,500 of that 
went for administrative salaries and expenses and only $500 
would up buying oil for the poor. And they're also trying 
to find out of the 268 gallons they bought what happened to , 
128 of them because they can't find where they went nor who 
got them. In Chicago in Welfare they have just uncovered 
what has to be the world's record-holder. A woman on Welfare 
under 80 names, 30 addresses, 15 telephone numbers, col­
lecting under all of them and her take is estimated at 
$150,000 a year tax free. Three years ago you and I were 
lined up at the gas stations to fill our tanks with gas-- 
the Arab boycott was on. A half a million workers in this 
country lost their jobs because there wasn't fuel to keep 
the factories running. Project Independence was launched
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with great fanfare in Washington. We were going to increase 
the domestic production of oil and natural gas so that never 
again would we be subject to blackmail of this kind. Then 
for three years the most irresponsible congress in the mem­
ory of anyone of us did nothing but talk. If we could have 
harnessed that hot air, we wouldn't have had to turn down 
the thermostats. Finally, with three years gone, they 
passed an energy bill which almost every person with any 
common sense believed the President would veto--indeed he 
said he would veto it--except that Zarb (his own appointee) 
helped draft it and then it was signed into law. It is a 
disaster. It never should have been signed. Drilling rigs, 
exploring for new oil, have closed down all over the country 
because there is no longer any incentive to develop domestic 
sources. A few weeks ago for the first time in our history 
we imported more than we produced. And we are producing less 
than we were three years ago when the embargo was slapped on 
us. What happens when there is another embargo now? The 
energy bill should be repealed and the government should get 
out of the way and let the free enterprise system produce .... 
(applause drowned it out).
I take no pleasure in saying this, but in a time of 
great trouble when we are threatened with economic disaster 
at home and aggression from abroad, we seem to have had in 
place of leadership vacillation and decisions that are 
based on election year expediency. In North Carolina, for
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example, Mr. Ford said that he was against gun control, 
but in Washington his Attorney General pushes a 7-point gun 
control measure before the Congress. I have never believed 
that gun control is an answer to crime if it means making 
it impossible for the law abiding to get a gun while it 
does nothing to keep the criminals from getting them. So 
no one can say I am just against things X think we have a 
couple of laws in California that provided the answer to 
this. We have what I think are proper gun control laws. If 
someone is convicted of a crime and when he committed that 
crime he had a gun in his possession whether he used it or 
not add five to fifteen years to the prison sentence. And 
the second law says that no judge can find a man guilty if he 
was carrying a gun and turn him back out on the street on 
probat ion--he must serve a mandatory prison sentence.
We are hearing great talk now of economy in Washing­
ton. They're going to reduce the postal services--what 
services are left--and the post offices, they're going to 
be reduced in number. But Congress has just decided to 
increase our subsidy to the United Nations. We're going to 
add $44 billion to the $188 billion we are already paying.
Now the payroll of the United Nations is 3/4 of the budget 
and the U.N. employees are drawing salaries that are 15% 
higher than our own government employees. Right now we are 
paying 1/4 of the total budget for the United Nations.
Senator Dewey Bartlett of Oklahoma has proposed that we
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reduce the 1/4 to only 15% over a five year period. His 
proposal hasn't been adopted, but I would suggest that Mr. 
Ford tell his new Ambassador to the United Nations to start 
negotiating with the officials of the U.N. on that basis.
Since 1973 Washington has been negotiating the give­
away of the Panama Canal Zone. The military dictator.
General Omar Torillos, who seized power with the overthrow 
of the duly elected government 8 years ago, has made this 
demand and apparently the only people or the only ones who 
aren't aware of the give-away that's being planned are the 
real owners of the Canal, the people of the United States.
Now we are told that the negotiations are going to slow down 
and no decision will be made until after the elections. Well, 
the Panama Canal Zone is sovereign United States territory.
It is every bit as much American soil as is the land the 
states were carved out of the Gadston Louisiana Purchases 
and as is the State of Alaska, and in my opinion what we 
should be saying to that tinhorn dictator is, "We bought it, 
we paid for it, if we built it it's ours, and we intend to 
keep it." I made a rather blunt statement a little while 
ago about political expediency. In one of the recent pri­
maries Mr. Ford declared because I have been talking on 
this subject and demanding an answer to it flatly that he 
does not intend to give away the Panama Canal. Just today 
we learned that he has issued written instructions to the 
State Department to do just that. Congressman Gene Snyder
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of Kentucky has released testimony given to the House Panama 
Canal Subcommittee by Ambassador Elsworth Bunker, the Chief 
Negotiator, on April 8. Although the testimony was originally 
secret Congressman Snyder obtained unanimous approval of the 
subcommittee to release his line of questioning of Bunker.
The following excerpt of that record makes it quite clear 
just what Mr. Ford's intentions are about this sovereign 
United States territory. Ambassador Bunker said: "Mr.
Congressman, we're proceeding to negotiate under guidelines 
established by the President, both by President Nixon and 
President Ford." Congressman Snyder says, "I do not think 
that is responsive to my question. I want to know what 
directive or directives the State Department has received 
from President Ford to do this." Ambassador Bunker says,
"We have been directed to proceed with the negotiations on 
the basis of the guidelines." "To give it up, to give up 
the Canal Zone over a period of time?" And Bunker, "To 
give up the Canal Zone after a period of time, that is 
correct." "And the Canal over a longer period of time?"
And Mr. Bunker said, "A longer period of time." Congressman 
Snyder said, "A longer period of time, and what are the 
directives? Are they written memorandums?" Bunker said,
"The directives are in written memorandums." "Signed by 
the President?" "Signed by the President." "Under what 
date?" "Under varying and various dates." So the negoti­
ations will be slowed down until after the election and 
then they will proceed to give away sovereign United States
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territory. This leads to what I believe is the most impor­
tant problem confronting us, our foreign policy and the 
basis of our national security.
Earlier this year Dr. Kissinger said there was no 
alternative to detente, as yet during these years of detente, 
a word that Mr. Ford no longer uses, that balance of power 
has been shifting in favor of the Soviet Union. The Soviets' 
annual investment in weapons runs from 50% greater than 
ours. The Secretary of the Army, Martin R. Hoffman, has 
told the Senate Armed Forces Committee recently, if we were
to go to war tomorrow the army could equip only half of its
16 divisions. The Army Chief of Staff, General Fred Wien, 
has said to the House Armed Services Committee, "In the
event of conflict our army deployments would be too little
and too late." This is what I believe former Secretary 
Schlessenger was trying to tell us, that we're No. 2 in a 
world where it is fatal to be second best, and I believe 
that's why Dr. Schlessenger was fired. But the situation 
goes beyond just an imbalance in weaponry. The real issue 
is one that's all too typical of that little band of elite 
that sit on the shores of the Potomac. That is their ina­
bility to trust the people of this country. Dr. Kissinger 
has said that he does not believe the American people have 
the will or the stamina to keep this nation in No. 1 posi­
tion. Well, I don't believe there is any problem with the 
lack of will on the part of the American people. I think
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the problem is a lack of information of the problems con­
fronting us because they haven't trusted us with knowing 
the truth. Now, I know that Mr. Ford has asked the Congress 
for more money for defense, and I am aware, as I said 
before, of the irresponsibility of the Congress. And I 
can understand his having faith in the Washington Establish­
ment's ability to solve the problems because of his long 
association with that Establishment. I don't share that 
faith. I don't believe that those who have been associated 
with the build-up of the problems over a long period of time 
are necessarily the best qualified to solve those problems.
We can no longer afford politics as usual with the preserva­
tion of the buddy system. Believe me, those who believe in 
their own omnipotence, big government makes small people, and 
what's needed today are big people making government small. 
Why should anyone fear our ability or the lack of will on 
the part of living Americans today? Americans of today have 
fought harder, paid a higher price for freedom, and done 
more to advance the dignity of man than any people who ever 
lived on this earth. We've known 4 wars in my own generation 
and a Great Depression that toppled governments and changed 
the national boundaries of countries. No self-anointed 
elite in the nation's capital need be fearful of our ability 
to hear the harsh, blunt truth about any problem. Mr. Ford 
expressed an idea that in support of his candidacy we should 
have a continuity of government in Washington. Do you
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really want to continue what's been going on in Washington?
I don't. I think it is time to turn a number of things that 
Washington has been doing back to states at local levels 
closer to the people. I think that we . . . (applause)
Based on our own experiences in California where we 
i^Gformed and reduced Welfare by hundreds of thousands of 
recipients and saved billions of dollars for the taxpayers,
I think Welfare should be back closer to the people in its 
management. Joe Doakes is drawing welfare and drinking beer 
and ganûjling down at the comer poolhall with his welfare 
check, his neighbors are paying the bill, if they have a 
little more voice in government, he would have to undergo a 
change in lifestyle.
We built the greatest public school system the world 
has ever seen, and we built it at the local levels. I think 
that education should be given back to the local school dis­
tricts and to the parents and who knows, that might even 
result in God getting back into the classroom.
When I made my decision to seek our party's nomination, 
victory was the most important consideration, not victory for 
me in the nomination of the primary, victory for our party 
come next November. No Republican is going to win without 
getting the support of millions of Independents and Democrats. 
The problems confronting us cross party lines. Now in '72 
we had that kind of support. Millions of people ignored 
party lines. X don't claim that they voted necessarily
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for us. They voted against what they understood for the 
first time was the policy of the leadership of the Democratic 
party and they didn't want to follow that leadership. Well, 
this time I think we can give them something to vote for. 
They're still out there ; they're still looking for a banner 
around which to rally. I believe the people of this country 
are hungry to feel once again a pride within themselves and 
in their government. I believe that they want to believe 
once more in the moral values upon which this nation was 
founded. So let's tell them that, yes, we're a party that 
has compassions. We'll take care of the needy, but we will 
give all those who are needy and ablebodied an opportunity 
to work at useful community projects in return for their 
welfare money. (?) Let us tell them that we intend to 
restore fiscal sanity by balancing the budget and ending the 
inflation which robs us of our earnings and mortgages the_____
future of our children. Let's tell them that we believe that 
this nation will do whatever has to be done to be strong that 
no other nation will ever be tempted to break the peace and 
test that strength. And while we're at it let's tell them 
there was an immorality committed by this nation's government 
in recent years that will never be repeated. But if ever 
again we ask young Americans to fight and die for their 
country, it will be for a cause we intend to win.'
Just yesterday morning I went over where they're 
opening the mail that had come in from the broadcast I
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mentioned, and they handed me some letters to read, and 
they were very humbling and they were very touching. And 
one of those letters I think I'll share with you. He said, 
"I left Hungary in 1956, away from the brutal Bolshevik rape 
of that brave county. I saw Communism in action. I know 
what is in store for the world. 1 was shocked by the inac­
tion of America and the Western world in 1956 and equally 
shocked at the total ignorance of decent and good Americans 
about the true face of Communism. Penniless 20 years ago, 
today I have a small business, have never been on welfare, 
never received a handout. I only work and use the oppor­
tunity this country gave me to choose my own course in life. 
I feel I have come close to the American dream, to be free, 
independent, and proud. I never stopped thanking God for 
giving me this change." This is what this election is all 
about--to restore and keep that American dream, to keep the 
kind of peace and freedom in our country. I mentioned vic­
tory a little while ago. If I did not believe in my heart 
that I offer our party the best chance of victory in next 
November, I would not be here asking for your vote and your 
support, and I do ask for your vote and your support.
APPENDIX D 
DESCRIPTION OF SAMPLE
A breakdown of the entire sample indicates that the 
mean age for respondents was 40.112, and mean education level 
is 13.4, or one and one-half years of college. A total of 
28 males (31.5%) and 61 females (68.5%) comprised the sample 
although precautions were taken to make the interviews during 
evening hours to maximize the likelihood of getting an even 
distribution. Distribution by political party was close, with 
27 Republicans (30.3%), 27 Democrats (30.3%,) and 35 Inde­
pendents (39.3%). Also, 38 (42.7%) respondents preferred 
Gerald Ford for the Republican nomination, 39 (43.8%) pre­
ferred Ronald Reagan, and 12 (13.5%,) expressed no preference. 
By self-report interest in the election was high, with 49 
(55.1%) respondents stating that they were "very interested" 
in the election. A total of 27 (30.3%) said they were 
"somewhat interested," and 13 (14.6%) reported "not much" 
interest in the election. Average hours of television view­
ing per day was 2.5. Data concerning the source of the 
respondents' information about the election indicates that 
43 respondents (48.3%) got most of their information from 
newspaper. Television ranked second as a source, with 34 
respondents (38.2% stating that they got most of their 
election information from television. Only 7 (7.9%) 
respondents named radio as their primary source, and 5 (5.6%) 
respondents named other people.
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